Descriptive indications as part of composite marks - The scope of protection awarded to non-distinctive elements of otherwise distinctive trademarks by Thelander, Anton
	   
 FACULTY	  OF	  LAW	  Lund	  University	  	  	  	  Anton	  Thelander	  	  	  Descriptive	  indications	  as	  part	  of	  composite	  marks	  	  The	  scope	  of	  protection	  awarded	  to	  non-­‐distinctive	  elements	  of	  otherwise	  distinctive	  trademarks	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  JAEM03	  Master	  Thesis	  	  European	  Business	  Law	  30	  higher	  education	  credits	  	  	  Supervisor:	  Ulf	  Maunsbach	  	  Term:	  Spring	  2013	  	  
 1 
Table of contents 
 
Summary ...................................................................................................................... 3	  
Sammanfattning ........................................................................................................... 4	  
Preface .......................................................................................................................... 5	  
Abbreviations ............................................................................................................... 6	  
1. Introduction ............................................................................................................. 7	  
1.1. Background ................................................................................................................... 7	  
1.2. Purpose ........................................................................................................................... 7	  
1.3. Methodology and material ........................................................................................... 8	  
1.4. Delimitations .................................................................................................................. 9	  
1.5. Terminology ................................................................................................................. 10	  
1.6. Outline .......................................................................................................................... 10	  
2. Trademark law in the European Union .............................................................. 12	  
2.1. History and evolution of European Union trademark law ..................................... 12	  
2.2. Rationale behind trademark protection ................................................................... 14	  
2.3. Functions of trademarks ............................................................................................ 15	  
2.4. The need to keep signs free ........................................................................................ 16	  
3. Registration of a Community Trade Mark ......................................................... 19	  
3.1. Registrable marks ....................................................................................................... 19	  
3.1.1. Sign ........................................................................................................................ 20	  
3.1.2. Capable of being represented graphically ............................................................. 20	  
3.1.3. Capable of distinguishing ...................................................................................... 21	  
3.2. Absolute grounds for refusal ...................................................................................... 21	  
3.2.1. Marks devoid of distinctive character ................................................................... 22	  
3.2.1.1. Relevant public ............................................................................................................ 23	  
3.2.1.2. Distinctiveness ............................................................................................................ 23	  
3.2.2. Marks that consist exclusively of descriptive indications ..................................... 24	  
3.3. Marks that consist exclusively of customary indications ........................................ 26	  
3.4. Disclaimers ................................................................................................................... 26	  
3.5. Relative grounds for refusal ....................................................................................... 27	  
3.6. The registration of a word .......................................................................................... 28	  
4. Registration of composite and compound marks ............................................... 30	  
4.1. Signs of which a trademark may consist ................................................................... 30	  
4.2. Absolute grounds for refusal ...................................................................................... 30	  
4.2.1. Descriptiveness ...................................................................................................... 30	  
 2 
4.2.2. Distinctiveness ....................................................................................................... 31	  
4.3. Conclusion ................................................................................................................... 32	  
5. Scope of protection ................................................................................................ 33	  
5.1. Opposition proceedings and infringement proceedings .......................................... 34	  
5.2. Double identity ............................................................................................................ 36	  
5.2.1. Identical sign .......................................................................................................... 37	  
5.2.2. Border to similarity and likelihood of confusion ................................................... 37	  
5.3. Likelihood of confusion .............................................................................................. 38	  
5.3.1. The need to keep signs free and infringement procedures .................................... 41	  
5.3.2. Relevant territory and relevant public ................................................................... 41	  
5.3.3. Comparison of goods and services ........................................................................ 43	  
5.3.4. Comparison of signs .............................................................................................. 44	  
5.3.4.1. Signs to be compared .................................................................................................. 46	  
5.3.4.2. Visual comparison ....................................................................................................... 46	  
5.3.4.3. Aural comparison ........................................................................................................ 47	  
5.3.4.4. Conceptual comparison ............................................................................................... 48	  
5.3.5. Distinctiveness ....................................................................................................... 48	  
5.3.5.1. Distinctiveness of a mark’s components ..................................................................... 49	  
5.3.5.2. Disclaimers .................................................................................................................. 50	  
5.3.6. Dominant character ................................................................................................ 51	  
5.3.6.1. Assessing dominance .................................................................................................. 52	  
5.3.6.2. Dominant character and distinctiveness ...................................................................... 52	  
5.3.7. Assessment of factors – a global assessment ......................................................... 53	  
5.4. The scope of protection ............................................................................................... 53	  
5.4.1. Opposition proceedings ......................................................................................... 53	  
5.4.2. Infringement proceedings ...................................................................................... 54	  
5.4.2.1. Use in the course of trade ............................................................................................ 54	  
5.4.2.2. Defences ...................................................................................................................... 54	  
6. Proposal for amending the Community Trade Mark Regulation .................... 57	  
7. Analysis ................................................................................................................... 58	  
Bibliography ............................................................................................................... 62	  
Table of cases ............................................................................................................. 64	  
 
 3 
Summary 
 
The protection awarded to trademarks includes the right to prevent others from using 
signs confusingly similar to the trademark, for similar goods or services. The thesis 
aims to establish to what extent descriptive indications or non-distinctive elements 
could be registered as part of a trademark, as well as to discern the scope of protection 
awarded to such non-distinctive elements of otherwise distinctive trademarks. 
 
There exists an incentive for businesses to choose descriptive marks for their goods. If 
they are successful in registering such descriptive marks, and if they are successful in 
prohibiting others from using the descriptive indications, it places the registrant's 
competitors at a disadvantage in marketing their similar goods as they cannot forward 
descriptive information in an as flexible manner. A trademark proprietor may also 
threaten unmeritorious proceedings against competitors wishing to use descriptive 
indications that are part of the proprietor’s trademark.  
 
The thesis focus on Community Trade Marks, and the rules regarding the registration 
and protection of such marks is found in the Community Trade Mark Regulation. The 
Regulation contains several grounds for refusal aimed at preventing the registration of 
descriptive or non-distinctive indications as trademarks. While such descriptive or 
non-distinctive indications are not allowed registration independently, they can be 
registered as part of a composite or compound mark. The sign to be registered must 
be looked at in its entirety. As long as other elements are added, so that the sign is not 
exclusively descriptive or devoid of distinctive character, it can be registered. 
 
Once such a mark is registered the proprietor can prevent similar signs from being 
used or registered, either through opposition proceedings or infringement 
proceedings. Similar signs can be prevented from being used if there exists a 
likelihood of confusion between a third party’s sign and an earlier Community Trade 
Mark. A likelihood of confusion can be established if there is a risk that the relevant 
public might believe that the goods or services in question come from the same 
undertaking or from economically linked undertakings due to the signs and products 
being similar or identical. The main rule is that descriptive or non-distinctive elements 
of a trademark should be given low or no importance when determining the existence 
of a likelihood of confusion. However, there are cases in which signs have been 
successfully opposed even though the only coinciding element of the opposed sign 
and the earlier trademark was a descriptive indication.  
 
Thus, there are circumstances under which the proprietor of a trademark containing 
descriptive indications could prevent the use of the descriptive indication. It is 
proposed that the legislator should clarify in which way descriptive indications should 
be protected, possibly by stating that such indications should be ignored when 
establishing the existence of a likelihood of confusion.  
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Sammanfattning 
 
Skyddet som tilldelas varumärken inkluderar rätten att hindra andra från att använda 
märken som är förväxlingsbara med detta tidigare varumärke för liknande varor eller 
tjänster. Syftet med denna uppsats är att fastställa i vilken utsträckning beskrivande 
termer eller icke särskiljande element skulle kunna registreras som en del av ett 
varumärke, samt att urskilja omfattningen av skyddet som tilldelas sådana icke 
särskiljande element i annars distinkta varumärken. 
 
Det finns flera incitament för företag att välja beskrivande varumärken för sina 
produkter. Om de lyckas registrera sådana beskrivande varumärken, och om de lyckas 
förbjuda andra från att använda samma beskrivande termer, missgynnas konkurrenter 
då dessa inte kan vidarebefordra den beskrivande informationen på samma smidiga 
sätt. En varumärkesinnehavare kan också hota konkurrenter, som vill använda 
beskrivande termer som ingår i innehavarens varumärke, genom ogrundade 
förfaranden. 
 
Denna uppsats fokuserar på gemenskapsvarumärken, och reglerna kring registrering 
och skydd av sådana märken finns att finna i Rådets förordning om 
gemenskapsvarumärken. Förordningen innehåller flera grunder för avslag med syfte 
att hindra registreringen av termer som är beskrivande eller saknar 
särskiljningsförmåga. Även om sådana termer inte kan registreras självständigt så kan 
de registreras som en del av sammansatta varumärken. Märket som ska registreras 
måste bedömas i sin helhet, och så länge andra element läggs till så att märket inte är 
uteslutande beskrivande eller saknar särskiljningsförmåga så kan det registreras. 
 
När ett sådant sammansatt varumärke är registrerat kan innehavaren förhindra att 
liknande kännetecken används eller registreras, antingen genom ett 
invändningsförfarande eller intrångsförfarande. Användningen av liknande märken 
kan stoppas om det finns en risk för förväxling mellan de två märkena. En 
förväxlingsrisk kan fastställas om det finns en risk att allmänheten kan tro att varorna 
eller tjänsterna i fråga kommer från samma företag eller från företag med ekonomiska 
band på grund av att märkena och produkterna är likartade eller identiska. 
Huvudregeln är att beskrivande element i ett varumärke bör ges liten eller ingen 
betydelse när domstolen fastställer förekomsten av en risk för förväxling. Trots detta 
finns det fall där varumärkesinnehavare har framgångsrikt motsatt sig användningen 
av ett annat märke trots att det enda sammanfallande elementet i de båda märken är ett 
beskrivande element. 
 
Således finns det tillfällen då innehavaren av ett varumärke som innehåller 
beskrivande termer kan förhindra användningen av samma beskrivande termer. Det 
föreslås i uppsatsen att lagstiftaren bör klargöra på vilket sätt beskrivande 
beteckningar bör skyddas, möjligen genom att fastställa att sådana beteckningar ska 
ignoreras vid ett fastställande av förväxlingsrisk. 
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1. Introduction 
 
1.1. Background 
 
There are over 900 000 Community Trade Marks registered as of 2013 and there 
exists an interest among owners of such trademarks, as well as those interested in 
procuring new ones, to understand the scope of protection awarded to the marks.1  
 
Trademarks have become a fundamental pillar when it comes to competition between 
businesses. Trademarks are guarantees of origin, confirmed to be their most essential 
function by the Court of Justice of the European Union.2 By extension trademarks are 
a way for companies to effectively build goodwill and reputation, and an increasing 
amount of money and effort is spent on trademarks. With this increasing importance 
and value of trademarks there exists a need to know to what extent they are protected. 
 
It is problematic when a company registers a descriptive indication, such as a word 
describing the product or its quality, as part of their trademark. There is a need from 
the public that such descriptive indications, or otherwise non-distinctive elements, 
should be able to be used by all. The courts that administer the Community Trade 
Marks have been incoherent in their assessments, and lately descriptive indications 
have been given undue importance. The question has been raised as to what extent 
such marks and elements should be protected. It is undisputed that an identical sign 
for identical products compared to that of an earlier trademark should be prohibited 
from being used or registered as a trademark, but should such protection also extend 
to cases in which the earlier trademark and the infringing sign only coincide in a 
descriptive indication? Concerns have surfaced that single companies would be able 
to monopolise descriptive indications by including them in a perpetual trademark.  
 
 
1.2. Purpose 
 
There have been cases where the Office for Harmonization in the Internal Market 
(Trade Marks and Designs) (OHIM) has refused the registration of a word mark due 
to it only comprising a descriptive or non-distinctive word while later granting the 
registration of a complex mark containing the same descriptive or non-distinctive 
word, and then granted an opposition against another Community Trade Mark 
application containing that same word element.3 To provide an example: in 2010 the 
sign ‘olive oil’ was denied registration due to it being exclusively descriptive of the 
goods or services applied for.4 In comparison, a couple of years earlier the mark 
                                                
1 Office for Harmonization in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs), Statistics of Community 
Trade Marks (SSC009, 2013) 31. 
2 cf Case C-206/01 Arsenal Football Club plc v Matthew Reed [2002] ECR I-10273 (Arsenal v Reed); 
Case C-487/07 L'Oréal SA, Lancôme parfums et beauté & Cie SNC and Laboratoire Garnier & Cie v 
Bellure NV, Malaika Investments Ltd and Starion International Ltd [2009] ECR I-05185 
(L'Oréal/Bellure). 
3 Charles Gielen and Verena von Bomhard (eds), Concise European Trade Mark and Design Law 
(Kluwer Law International 2011) 129. 
4 Rejected Community Trade Mark application ‘OLIVE OIL’, Application Nº 008900201, date of 
refusal 21/09/10. 
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‘Olive line’ was permitted registration.5 The ‘Olive line’ mark was later able to 
prevent the registration of another mark that was using the word ‘olive’, although they 
did only coincide in that descriptive word.6 
 
The protection awarded to trademarks includes the right to prevent others from using 
signs confusingly similar to the trademark, for similar goods or services. While 
descriptive or non-distinctive words are not allowed registration independently, they 
can be registered as part of a device mark, and once registered award protection to 
that word by allowing the proprietor to prevent similar signs from being used or 
registered.7 Such behaviour would erode the trademark system, and steps have been 
taken to prevent such occurrences. Still, the problem is real, and such abuse can be 
observed.8  
 
This thesis will establish to what extent descriptive indications or non-distinctive 
elements could be registered as part of a trademark, as well as to discern the scope of 
protection awarded to such non-distinctive elements of otherwise distinctive 
trademarks. The thesis will not discuss acquired distinctiveness through use. Focus 
will be on the registration of descriptive or non-distinctive indication that has not 
acquired distinctiveness and would not be allowed registration independently, and the 
scope of protection awarded to such elements when they are part of a bigger complex 
mark, with the elements still being considered descriptive and non-distinctive. 
 
It will also contemplate whether there exists a need to keep some signs free for all to 
use, and to what extent this corresponds with the possibility to monopolise non-
distinctive elements, such as descriptive words, using a trademark registration. 
 
 
1.3. Methodology and material 
 
This thesis will focus on the possibility to register descriptive or non-distinctive 
indications as part of complex trademarks in the Community Trade Mark system, and 
the protection awarded to such elements. The thesis could thus be seen as twofold.  
 
Traditional legal dogmatic method will be used, and the primary source of 
information will be legislation and case law at Community level. Focus will be on the 
Community Trade Mark Regulation9, but identical provisions as those to be analysed 
                                                
5 Registered Community Trade Mark ‘Olive line’ (fig), Trade mark No 005086657, registration date 
14/05/2007. 
6 Case T-485/07 Olive Line International, SL v OHIM [2011] Not yet published (Olive Line). 
7 Amanda Michaels and Andrew Norris, A Practical Approach to Trade Mark Law (4th edn, Oxford 
University Press 2010) 153. 
8 Tobias Cohen Jehoram and Constantinus van Nispen, European Trademark Law: Community 
Trademark Law and Harmonized National Trademark Law (Wolters Kluwer 2010) 295. 
9 Council Regulation (EC) No 207/2009 of 26 February 2009 on the Community trade mark [2009] OJ 
L78/1 (Community Trade Mark Regulation). 
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can be found in the Trade Mark Directive10, thus sources concerning both will be 
considered.11 
 
Complementary material such as legal doctrine, legal articles, examination guidelines 
and case law from OHIM, the Board of Appeal and the General Court will be used.  
As the case law from these courts are not binding, they will be used to illustrate 
current practice. The same applies to OHIM’s examination guidelines. Some material 
originates from the USA and will only be used to further illustrate some of the 
complications relating to the topic, as well as to provide further guidance on what 
could be done to solve any eventual problems.  
 
The discussion will be made from the point of view of the legislator, with the aim of 
finding any problems connected to the registration and protection of descriptive 
indications. The discussion could also be seen as made from the point of view of 
trademark proprietors, as their needs reflect the conflicting interests in allowing new 
trademarks to be registered and to protect those that already are. 
 
The legal requirements and their application are described and analysed individually 
in the thesis’ main chapters, with the final chapter considering what has already been 
stated to enable an analysis of the subject of the thesis. 
 
 
1.4. Delimitations 
 
This thesis will only deal with substantive law, procedural matters will not be 
discussed and will only be mentioned to enable the reader to understand the material 
problems. Focus will be on registration and protection concerning trademark law, and 
other intellectual property rights will not be part of the thesis. Economics and 
competition law will be left outside the thesis. EU law, and especially the Community 
Trade Mark system, is at the centre of this thesis. Other jurisdictions will not be dealt 
with. 
 
The thesis assumes that the reader has at least basic knowledge of intellectual 
property law, and especially trademark law, as well as of the European Union and EU 
law.  
 
Composite marks, consisting of words and pictorial elements, are at the centre of the 
investigation, and other marks such as shape marks, colours per se, etcetera will only 
be used to illustrate underlying interests of European trademark law. When discussing 
registrability, some grounds for refusal are left out, such as deceptive marks and 
marks contrary to public policy. The comparison of goods and services, as well as 
acquired distinctiveness through use, will only be mentioned briefly. The thesis will 
focus on the registration of descriptive or non-distinctive indication that has not 
acquired distinctiveness and would not be allowed registration independently, and the 
                                                
10 Directive 2008/95/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 October 2008 to 
approximate the laws of the Member States relating to trade marks [2008] OJ L299/25 (Trade Mark 
Directive). 
11 cf Case T-156/01 Laboratorios RTB, SL v OHIM [2003] ECR II-02789 para 61; Case T-288/03 
TeleTech Holdings, Inc v OHIM [2005] ECR II-01767 para 75. 
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scope of protection awarded to such elements when they are part of a composite or 
compound mark, the elements still being considered descriptive and non-distinctive. 
 
 
1.5. Terminology 
 
In this thesis Italics are used for Latin expressions and for emphasis. Words that form 
part of trademarks will be written in capital letters. 
 
There are several words used to denote trademarks that are encompassing more than 
one element. When using terms such as complex marks, compound marks and 
composite marks, they all refer to marks consisting of more than one element. These 
different expressions are used interchangeably, and what is said about any of them 
apply to all.  
 
The word ‘sign’ and ‘mark’ is used to designate symbols that have or have not been 
registered as trademarks, while the word ‘trademark’ indicates that such symbols have 
been registered. When the word ‘product’ is used, it is meant to include both goods 
and services. 
 
The Court of Justice of the European Union is used to designate the institution within 
the European Union that contains the whole judiciary, most notably the Court of 
Justice (or ‘the Court’, formerly the European Court of Justice, or ECJ) and the 
General Court (formerly the Court of First Instance). The new terminologies are used 
even when referring to judgments predating the Treaty of Lisbon and the change of 
names associated with the new treaty. 
 
 
1.6. Outline 
 
Chapter 2 is about trademark law in general, going into its ratio juris, the functions of 
trademarks and the need to keep signs free. This chapter is important, as it provides a 
way to compare actual practise with the more general thoughts surrounding 
trademarks and trademark protection. 
 
Chapter 3 deals with the registration of Community Trade Marks and the general rules 
on what signs are considered to be registrable. It also goes through the absolute and 
relative grounds for refusal. The rules prohibiting the registration of purely 
descriptive or non-distinctive indications are an important part of trademark 
registration and trademark protection and will be given space in this chapter. The end 
of chapter 3 deals with the registration of word marks and cases in which words 
cannot be registered due to them being descriptive or non-distinctive. 
 
Chapter 4 deals with those cases where such descriptive or non-distinctive words 
could be permitted registration as part of a device/figurative mark, complex trademark 
or composite trademark. 
 
Chapter 5 delves into the scope of protection awarded to trademarks, and especially 
the protection awarded to non-distinctive elements of otherwise distinctive composite 
marks. 
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Chapter 6 will briefly go into the new proposal for amendments of the Community 
Trade Mark Regulation and if any of these changes would affect the way in which 
descriptive indications, or otherwise non-distinctive signs, are treated. 
 
Chapter 7 presents an analysis on the possibilities to register descriptive indications as 
part of a trademark, what protection is granted to such elements, and whether the 
approach towards such indications is appropriate. 
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2. Trademark law in the European Union 
 
Trademarks have been used for centuries and have changed from being simple 
indications of ownership into valuable assets of companies. EU trademark law holds 
that there are several functions of trademarks, one being their ability to indicate 
origin, and has built much of the trademark system around these functions. If a mark 
can fulfil these functions, then it can be registered as a trademark and merits 
protection. 
 
This chapter goes through the history and evolution of EU trademark law, the 
functions of trademarks, as well as the need to keep signs free. The latter is a concept 
that has been established in the case law of the Court of Justice,12 and ascertains a 
need for descriptive indications to be kept free for all to use and not be monopolised 
by a small number of companies through the use of trademarks. This will act as the 
basis for further discussions on the possibility to register, and successfully protect, 
descriptive indications or non-distinctive elements. 
 
 
2.1. History and evolution of European Union trademark law 
 
Trademarks have been used for centuries. The underlying reasons for using them have 
changed as our views on trademarks have changed.13 Originally trademarks were used 
as an indication of ownership – for example as branding on cattle.14 During a time in 
which guilds produced crafts for sale, trademarks developed into signs of origin.15 
This allowed customers to identify whom to hold responsible in case of a 
malfunctioning product, or allow them to repeat a satisfactory purchase by buying a 
product bearing the same mark of origin.16 
 
Trademarks were here to stay. As markets expanded, as did the worth of trademarks, 
resulting in a desire to protect trademark rights legally. This was further stressed 
during the age of industrialisation, where trademarks became more and more used in 
advertisement. It was now well established that trademarks could be used as 
indications of origin as well as of quality.17 Trademarks became symbols, and could 
single-handedly aid sales by making products desirable to consumers.18 
 
Today, trademarks could be the difference between success and failure when 
launching a new product. Some products are bought because of their trademark and 
the message they convey to the consumer as well as to others. Some products, due to 
their trademarks, could, in a sense, bring status or identity to a consumer. 
                                                
12 Joined cases C-108/97 & C-109/97 Windsurfing Chiemsee Produktions- und Vertriebs GmbH v 
Boots- und Segelzubehör Walter Huber and Franz Attenberger [1999] ECR I-02779 (Windsurfing 
Chiemsee) para 25. 
13 Thomas D. Drescher, ‘The Transformation and Evolution of Trademarks: Signals to Symbols to 
Myth’ (1992) 82 Trademark Reporter 301, 338. 
14 Sidney A. Diamond, ‘The Historical Development of Trademarks’ (1975) 65 Trademark Reporter 
265, 267. 
15 Drescher (n 13) 309-10. 
16 Catherine Seville, EU intellectual property law and policy (Edward Elgar 2009) 210. 
17 Drescher (n 13) 321. 
18 Seville (n 16) 210. 
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Functionality has become less important.19 Providing a picture on the huge value of 
trademarks: in 1986 The Coca-Cola Company was appraised at $14 billion, of which 
$7 billion was the value of the COCA-COLA trademark.20 In 2011 Google was 
considered to be the most valuable trademark in the world, with a trademark value of 
$44.3 billion.21 
 
Legal protection of trademarks was demanded due to their value and significance. 
Products were no longer sold solely on the local market, and international 
harmonisation was called for. In 1883 the Paris Convention for the Protection of 
Industrial Property was signed. The convention, administered by the World 
Intellectual Property Organization (‘WIPO’), focus on the harmonisation of 
substantive law. All European countries have acceded the convention, and even 
though the European Union is not part of the convention itself, traces of the 
convention could be found in EU trademark law. For example, similarities can be 
found between Article 6quinquies B of the Paris Convention and Articles 7 and 8 
CTMR relating to the absolute and relative grounds for refusal.22 Reference to the 
convention is made in the recitals of the TMD, and it is pointed out that the Directive 
would have to be consistent with the provisions in the convention as these bind all 
Member States.23 
 
The European Union, acknowledging the importance of a unified approach towards 
trademarks within the Union, began their pursuit with the Trade Mark Directive in 
which they harmonised trademark law, and later on with the Community Trade Mark 
Regulation in which they provided for a possibility to register trademarks at a 
Community level.24 
 
The Trade Mark Directive, not being a full-scale harmonisation of the laws of the 
Member States, harmonised substantive law relating to the acquisition and protection 
of trademarks. The TMD only focuses on those provisions necessary for the 
functioning of the free market, omitting provisions relating to procedural matters.25 
 
The Community Trade Mark system, which came into being in 1993, permits the 
registration of trademarks at Community level. The system coexists with the Member 
States’ national trademark systems, as these still fulfil a function within the global 
trademark system. Community Trade Marks are enforced in national courts that have 
been designated as special Community trade mark courts.26 Due to the CTMR and 
TMD being developed side-by-side, there are several provisions in the two that are 
identical or similar.27 
 
                                                
19 ibid 210-11. 
20 Drescher (n 13) 301. 
21 Sean Stonefield, ‘The 10 Most Valuable Trademarks’ (Forbes, 15 June 2011)  
<http://www.forbes.com/sites/seanstonefield/2011/06/15/the-10-most-valuable-trademarks/> 
accessed 4 May 2013. 
22 Seville (n 16) 212-14. 
23 Trade Mark Directive (n 10) 13th recital. 
24 Seville (n 16) 220. 
25 Trade Mark Directive (n 10) 2nd , 4th  and 6th recitals.  
26 Michaels and Norris (n 7) 7; Seville (n 16) 221. 
27 To illustrate, Articles 4, 7, 8 and 9 CTMR are partly identical to Articles 2, 3, 4, 5 TMD respectively. 
 14 
The Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs) 
(‘OHIM’) was formed in Alicante to oversee all the procedural matters associated 
with the Community Trade Mark Regulation. The OHIM has been very successful, 
always striving to become better, cheaper and more efficient, and the number of 
registrations are booming.28 The OHIM decides on registrations, and its decisions can 
be appealed to the Board of Appeal, then to the General Court and in the end to the 
Court of Justice.29 
 
The Community Trade Mark system is governed by several principles: the unitary 
character of Community Trade Marks, the principle of autonomy, and the principle of 
coexistence.30 The unitary character is expressed in Article 1(2) CTMR where it is 
stated that the Community Trade Mark shall have effect throughout the Community 
without any limitations created by the Member States.31 The principle of autonomy 
asserts that Community Trade Marks are ruled only by the CTMR and any legislation 
associated with it,32 as well as by Community law principles. The principle of 
coexistence asserts that the Community Trade Mark system and the Member States’ 
national trademark systems could coexist. It is possible to register a Community 
Trade Mark, one or several national ones, or both.33 
 
 
2.2. Rationale behind trademark protection 
 
The protection and promotion of intellectual properties, to which trademarks belong, 
is of great importance within the EU, as they collectively promote innovation, 
employment, competition and, in the end, economic growth.34 This reasoning cannot 
be fully extended to trademarks, as trademarks do not promote innovation in the same 
manner as other intellectual property rights.  
 
There exists a public interest in that lowly distinctive trademarks are not registered 
and later exploited against third parties, with the result that competition is distorted.35 
In Hag36 the Court of Justice held that trademarks are an essential element in the 
system of undistorted competition, thus justifying its protection under EU law. An 
undertaking must be in a position to keep its customers by virtue of the quality of its 
products, which is enabled by the use of trademarks.37  
 
The ratio juris of trademark protection is closely related to the functions of 
trademarks. It is not the trademarks themselves that merit protection, but what can be 
achieved by using them, i.e. their functions. 
 
                                                
28 Seville (n 16) 221-22. 
29 Community Trade Mark Regulation (n 9) 12th-14th recitals. 
30 Gielen and von Bomhard (n 3) 5. 
31 Community Trade Mark Regulation (n 9) art 1(2). 
32 cf Commission Regulation (EC) No 2868/95 of 13 December 1995 implementing Council 
Regulation (EC) No 40/94 on the Community trade mark (CTMIR). 
33 Gielen and von Bomhard (n 3) 5. 
34 Seville (n 16) 220. 
35 Justine Antill, ‘Registrability and the scope of the monopoly: current trends’ (2004) 26 European 
Intellectual Property Review 157, 161. 
36 Case C-10/89 SA CNL-SUCAL NV v HAG GF AG [1990] ECR I-03711 (Hag). 
37 ibid para 13. 
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2.3. Functions of trademarks 
 
Trademarks become more and more important in today’s society as well as for the 
companies, and it allows the latter to build an image in relation to its products or the 
company itself. This image could be based on quality, style or any other positive 
attribute, and in the end result in better goodwill for the company. More and more 
money is invested into trademarks, and in some companies the trademark is the single 
most valuable asset. A trademark could, for example, convey quality, origin or any 
other positive or negative information, that in turn could enhance or reduce the value 
of a company’s business.38 Thus there are several important features of trademarks, 
and the question is whether they all merit protection. 
 
There is one feature that has been labelled the essential function of trademarks. The 
legislators of the CTMR, following the case law of the Court of Justice,39 have held 
the origin function of trademarks as the essential function of trademarks. The origin 
function is a trademarks possibility to act as an indication of origin.40  
 
This view was developed in Hoffman-La Roche41 where the Court of Justice stated 
that protection through trademark rights should protect a trademark proprietor from 
competitors taking advantage of the proprietor’s repute by selling products illegally 
bearing the proprietor’s trademark. The trademark should be a guarantee of the 
identity of the origin of the product, and help consumers to distinguish between 
products both before and after purchase. This, in turn, helps the consumers to keep 
track of which products they like and dislike.42  
 
The Court of Justice refers to ‘functions’ of a trademark, indicating that several exist 
besides the origin function.43 In L’Oréal/Bellure44 these other functions were stated. 
They are, inter alia, guarantee of quality function, advertising function and goodwill 
or investment function.45 These functions apply to all trademarks, and not only those 
with an enhanced reputation.46  
 
The other functions could be seen as subcategories to the origin function. To some 
consumers the quality of a product is the most important aspect when it comes to 
indicating origin.47 The question remains as to what length the Court of Justice would 
go to protect these other functions. The scope of protection, when purely looking at a 
                                                
38 Michaels and Norris (n 7) 6; Case T-215/03 SIGLA SA v OHIM [2007] ECR II-00711 para 35. 
39 Arsenal v Reed (n 2) paras 42, 48 and 51. 
40 Community Trade Mark Regulation (n 9) 8th recital. 
41 Case C-102/77 Hoffmann-La Roche & Co. AG contre Centrafarm Vertriebsgesellschaft 
Pharmazeutischer Erzeugnisse mbH [1978] ECR I-01139 (Hoffman-La Roche). 
42 ibid para 7; Case C-299/99 Koninklijke Philips Electronics NV v Remington Consumer Products Ltd 
[2002] ECR I-05475 (Philips) para 30. 
43 Cohen Jehoram and van Nispen (n 8) 9. 
44 L'Oréal/Bellure (n 2). 
45 ibid paras 58 and 63. 
46 ibid paras 63-64. 
47 Alison Firth, Gary Lea and Peter Cornford, Trade Marks: Law and Practice (3rd edn, Jordans 2012) 
8-9. 
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trademark’s functions, is not entirely set in stone yet, but the Court of Justice seems 
keen to at least protect some of the huge investments put into trademarks.48 
 
The function of a trademark is not solely to prevent consumers from being misled, but 
exist to promote innovation and commercial investment. A trademark protects the 
investment that the trademark proprietor has made and, in so doing, creates economic 
incentives for further innovation and investment. The other functions of the trademark 
relate to that promotion of innovation and investment.49 
 
 
2.4. The need to keep signs free 
 
Trademarks can be seen as economic rights, granting perpetual monopolies over 
symbols and words that are part of the trademark. The monopoly awarded through 
trademark protection is not absolute, and can change over time as it depends on the 
perception of the relevant public and what they consider to be a distinctive or 
descriptive mark or not.50 
 
Concerns have risen, especially in relation to the absolute ground for refusal relating 
to descriptive marks,51 concerning the possibility for traders to monopolise terms that 
may serve to designate a product’s characteristics. That trader would be granted an 
unfair advantage over competitors who have an interest in using such descriptive 
terms.52 In Libertel53 the discourse concerned colours per se and their registrability. It 
was held that the registration of single colours could confer a real monopoly of use of 
the colour on a few traders, a monopoly that in turn could distort competition. 
Competitors could be disadvantaged, and in some cases even be prevented from 
entering the market at all.54 
 
Another concern is that consumers could be disadvantaged if a company was granted 
a monopoly over a descriptive word. Only the proprietor could provide that 
descriptive information in an easy and accessible manner. Consumers should be 
provided an easy access to information so that they could become well informed, 
something that is hindered when descriptive words are controlled by a single 
company.55 
 
From this it can be concluded that in some cases there is a need to keep signs free, 
such as in the case of descriptive indications. Competitors should be able to use words 
that they may need in the course of trade, or else they would be at a disadvantage 
compared with those being able to use such words.56 A trademark should be denied 
                                                
48 Michaels and Norris (n 7) 9. 
49 Case C-236/08 Google France SARL and Google Inc v Louis Vuitton Malletier SA [2010] ECR I-
02417 (Google France and Google) Opinion of AG Maduro para 96. 
50 Cohen Jehoram and van Nispen (n 8) 7. 
51 Community Trade Mark Regulation (n 9) Art 7(1)(c). 
52 Case C-329/02 SAT.1 SatellitenFernsehen GmbH v OHIM [2004] ECR I-08317 (SAT2) Opinion of 
AG Jacobs para 22. 
53 Case C-104/01 Libertel Groep BV v Benelux-Merkenbureau [2003] ECR I-03793 (Libertel). 
54 ibid Opinion of AG Léger paras 101-103; Jeremy Phillips, ‘Trade Mark Law and the Need to Keep 
Free’ (2005) 36 International Review of Intellectual Property and Competition Law 389, 393. 
55 Phillips (n 54) 392. 
56 ibid 392, 399. 
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registration as a CTM if it consists exclusively of descriptive indications.57 The 
problem is that this does not prevent companies from registering descriptive 
indications as part of bigger composite or compound trademarks.  
 
In relation to the registration procedure, and especially the absolute ground for refusal 
concerning descriptive indications, the Court of Justice has stated that there exists a 
public interest objective to protect the need to keep certain signs free for general 
use.58  
 
The possibility of registering a trademark may be limited for reasons relating to public 
interest.59 Article 7(1)(c) CTMR pursues an aim which is in the public interest, 
namely that descriptive signs or indications relating to the categories of goods or 
services in respect of which registration is applied for may be freely used by all, 
including as collective marks or as part of complex or graphic marks. Article 7(1)(c) 
therefore prevents such signs and indications from being reserved to one undertaking 
alone because they have been registered as trade marks.60 To allow one trader to 
monopolise a term which may serve to designate a product’s characteristics would be 
to accord him an unfair advantage over competitors who have a legitimate interest in 
being able to use the term descriptively.61 
 
The public interest to keep signs free is only as good as it is achievable. Article 
7(1)(c) CTMR, with the underlying public interest that descriptive signs should be 
kept free, only prevents such signs to be registered if they are the sole element of that 
trademark. In certain circumstances such indications can be registered as part of 
complex trademarks. If these descriptive signs can be used in proceedings against 
other trademarks, then the public interest of keeping signs free would be ineffective, 
as companies still could get protection over descriptive indications.  
 
The justification for the need to keep signs free, that is to prevent traders from 
monopolising terms that may serve to designate a product’s characteristics, should 
influence other parts of the Community Trade Mark Regulation to be able to yield 
some result. Article 12 CTMR, that is dealt with later in this thesis, is another Article 
in the Regulation which prevents descriptive words from being monopolised, holding 
that such descriptive signs are allowed to be used honestly in the course of trade by 
anyone who desires to do so.62 Another possible solution would be the use of 
disclaimers, also dealt with later in this thesis. 
 
The risk with using the approach endorsed by Article 12, by granting the registration 
of descriptive indications under certain circumstances and later assert that the 
descriptive indications should be available to all, is that financially strong proprietors 
could threaten legal actions against those desirous of using the descriptive indications 
that are part of the proprietors’ trademarks.63 It is thus better to bar descriptive 
                                                
57 Community Trade Mark Regulation (n 9) art 7(1)(c). 
58 Phillips (n 54) 393; Windsurfing Chiemsee (n 12) para 25. 
59 Libertel (n 53) para 50. 
60 Windsurfing Chiemsee (n 12) para 25; Case C-53/01 Linde and Others [2003] I-03161 (Linde) para 
74. 
61 SAT.2 (n 52) Opinion of AG Jacobs para 22. 
62 Phillips (n 54) 397, 399. 
63 Case C-104/00 P DKV Deutsche Krankenversicherung AG v OHIM [2002] ECR I-7561 
(Companyline) Opinion of AG Colomer para 86; Case C-191/01 P OHIM v WM Wrigley JR Co 
 18 
trademarks from registration at an early stage. This would reduce the risk that such 
trademarks are used against defendants that do not have the will and necessary means 
to defend such an unmeritorious trademark infringement action.64 
 
                                                                                                                                      
[2003] ECR I-12447 (Doublemint) Opinion of AG Jacobs paras 94-95; Rasmus Dalsgaard Laustsen, 
‘The Principle of Keeping Free Within EU Trade Mark Law’ [2010] Retsvidenskabeligt Tidsskrift, 
10. 
64 Phillips (n 54) 399-400. 
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3. Registration of a Community Trade Mark 
 
This chapter deals with the substantive rules regarding the registration of a 
Community Trade Mark. It will provide a basis for determining which descriptive or 
non-distinctive indications cannot be registered in isolation, and under which 
circumstances such indications can be registered as part of complex, composite or 
compound marks. 
 
Any natural or legal person may register and be the proprietor of a CTM.65 The 
trademark application is to be filed at the OHIM or at a national trademark office in a 
Member State.66 The trademark application has to include: information about the 
applicant; a list specifying the goods and services the registration is for, and; a graphic 
representation of the trademark up for registration.67 The classifications used are the 
Nice Classification system for the goods and services, and the Vienna Classification 
system to classify figurative elements of the sign.68 Through the use of priority and 
seniority, one can turn a national trademark into a CTM.69 
 
When examining the application, OHIM can only deny registration if it falls within 
the absolute grounds for refusal in Article 7 CTMR.70 The registration is then 
published, and other parties get three months time to initiate opposition proceedings 
against the mark on the grounds established in Article 8 CTMR. 71  
 
For a sign to be registered by the OHIM it needs to: fall within the definition of a 
registrable mark; it must not fall within the scope of the absolute grounds for refusal; 
and it must not fall within the scope of the relative grounds for refusal.72 All these 
steps will be dealt with in this chapter, ending in an analysis of word marks and under 
what circumstances such a mark is unable to be registered due to its elements being 
descriptive or non-distinctive. 
 
 
3.1. Registrable marks 
 
A sign must qualify under Article 4 CTMR to be able to be registered as a 
Community Trade Mark. Article 4 regulates whether a sign, in the abstract, could be 
registered as a trademark, and specifies a minimum standard when it comes to the 
sign as such.73 Article 4 CTMR is mirrored in Article 2 TMD. Article 4 CTMR states 
that: 
 
A Community trade mark may consist of any signs capable of being represented 
graphically, particularly words, including personal names, designs, letters, numerals, 
the shape of goods or of their packaging, provided that such signs are capable of 
                                                
65 Community Trade Mark Regulation (n 9) art 5. 
66 ibid art 25(1). 
67 Seville (n 16) 222. 
68 ibid 222-23. 
69 Community Trade Mark Regulation (n 9) arts 29 and 34. 
70 ibid art 38. 
71 cf ibid arts 39-42, 51-53. 
72 Seville (n 16) 225. 
73 Gielen and von Bomhard (n 3) 9. 
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distinguishing the goods or services of one undertaking from those of other 
undertakings.74 
 
What constitutes a sign, and what is meant by capable of being represented 
graphically and capable of distinguishing is not developed further in the Regulation, 
and has been the subject of some of the case law coming from the Court of Justice.75 
 
A sign under examination is to be assessed under Article 4 CTMR several times,76 but 
for this thesis it is only important to note that Article 4 should be considered as part of 
the absolute grounds for refusal in Article 7 CTMR.  
 
 
3.1.1. Sign 
 
What should be considered a sign is interpreted broadly by OHIM, and could include 
sounds and three-dimensional shapes.77 The non-exhaustive list in Article 4 CTMR 
mentions words, personal names, designs, letters, numerals and the shape of goods or 
of their packaging. The limits were set in Dyson78 where the Court of Justice held that 
some shapes should not, and could not, be considered as a sign.79   
 
It is clear that words and figurative elements are capable of being signs, as these are 
included in the non-exhaustive list of examples in Article 4 CTMR. These are also the 
most common trademarks, with over 99% of all CTMs being word marks or 
figurative marks.80 The viewpoint on smells, sounds and single colours is much less 
developed by the Court of Justice.81 
 
 
3.1.2. Capable of being represented graphically 
 
The need for the sign to be capable of being represented graphically leads to legal 
certainty, as it ensures that the rights associated with the trademark are delineated 
precisely. It also helps others that are looking through the trademark registry to 
determine which trademarks are registered and to what extent they are protected.82  
 
The criterion is easily satisfied when merely considering the registration of words or 
pictures – the words are easily written and the pictures are easily depicted graphically. 
Problems arise when trying to register non-traditional trademarks such as sounds and 
                                                
74 Community Trade Mark Regulation (n 9) art 4. 
75 cf Case C-273/00 Ralf Sieckmann v Deutsches Patent- und Markenamt [2002] ECR I-11737 
(Sieckmann); Case C-321/03 Dyson Ltd v Registrar of Trade Marks [2007] ECR I-00687 (Dyson); 
Libertel (n 53). 
76 Such as when examined under Articles 26(1)(d), 27 and 36 CTMR, under the formalities check 
under Article 9 CTMIR, and when examined under the absolute grounds for refusal in Article 7(1)(a) 
CTMR. 
77 Seville (n 16) 225. 
78 Dyson (n 75). 
79 ibid paras 31-40. 
80 Statistics of Community Trade Marks (n 1) 31. 
81 Seville (n 16) 225-26. 
82 Sieckmann (n 75) paras 48-52. 
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smells, as these are harder to depict graphically.83 The criterion was developed further 
in Sieckmann84 in which the Court of Justice held that the graphic representation must 
be visual, particularly by means of images, lines or characters, so that it can be 
precisely identified.85  
 
 
3.1.3. Capable of distinguishing 
 
The last criterion, that the sign must be capable of distinguishing the product from 
that of others, is a result of the essential function of trademarks – i.e. that trademarks 
should be able to indicate origin.86 This criterion has only been given some attention 
from the Court of Justice, and is seen as a less specific criterion than that in the 
absolute ground for refusal concerning distinctiveness.87 It should be seen as an 
interrelated provision, underlining the need for a trademark to act as a guarantee of 
origin.88 
 
 
3.2. Absolute grounds for refusal 
 
Article 7 CTMR stipulates several absolute grounds for refusal that should be 
considered during the registration of a trademark. These grounds cover those cases 
where a sign lacks distinctiveness in any kind of way, as well as to protect some 
public interests.89 The grounds for refusal are considered to be absolute as they 
protect public interests and not those of individuals.90 
 
Any breach of the absolute grounds for refusal would result in the sign not being 
registered. This holds true only when the underlying public interests are breached, and 
is also why the grounds for refusal should be interpreted in the light of these public 
interests.91 
 
The first absolute ground for refusal refers to Article 4 CTMR, described above, 
stating that a mark would have to conform to the requirements set out by Article 4.92 
The next ground for refusal, Article 7(1)(b) CTMR, refers to a mark’s ability to act as 
an indication of origin, i.e. its distinctiveness.93 This ground for refusal is a more 
general one, and the following two grounds for refusal, Articles 7(1)(c)-(d) CTMR, 
could be seen as variations of the case in which a mark is devoid of distinctive 
character. 94  These two grounds for refusal are when the mark is exclusively 
descriptive of the goods or services or when the mark consists exclusively of 
                                                
83 Seville (n 16) 226. 
84 Sieckmann (n 75). 
85 ibid  (n 75) para 46. 
86 Seville (n 16) 231. 
87 cf Community Trade Mark Regulation (n 9) art 7(1)(b). 
88 Seville (n 16) 231. 
89 ibid 233. 
90 Gielen and von Bomhard (n 3) 22. 
91 Libertel (n 53) para 48-51. 
92 Community Trade Mark Regulation (n 9) art 7(1)(a). 
93 ibid art 7(1)(b). 
94 Seville (n 16) 233. 
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customary indications.95 There are several other absolute grounds for refusal, but this 
thesis will focus on the ones already mentioned here as these are the most relevant 
when registering non-distinctive or descriptive words or pictures as part of composite 
or compound marks. The other absolute grounds for refusal are, inter alia, the 
registration of shapes, signs contrary to public policy or signs that deceive the public. 
 
The grounds for refusal in Article 7(1)(b)-(d) CTMR could be remedied through 
Article 7(3) CTMR, making the sign registrable. Article 7(3) CTMR stipulates that 
7(1)(b)-(d) shall not apply if the trademark has become distinctive in consequence of 
the use that has been made of it. This is an important aspect when it comes to 
registration or when someone, after registration, raises doubt that the mark is 
distinctive and that it should be declared invalid.96 There is no requirement that the 
use of the mark should be done independently, but could form part of another mark.97 
A sign that, unused, is seen as descriptive or otherwise non-distinctive, and due to this 
cannot be registered, can be registered if evidence is brought forward to prove that the 
mark is distinctive due to the use that has been made of it.98 Not all use will remedy a 
sign devoid of distinctiveness, and the key to understanding this is to understand the 
essential function of trademarks – the mark, after acquired distinctiveness through 
use, should be able to act as an indication of origin. Article 7(3) CTMR is interesting 
as it can trump the underlying public interest in Article 7(1)(c) to keep signs free. This 
provision will, however, not be dealt with as such in this thesis. The thesis will focus 
on the registration of descriptive or non-distinctive indication that has not acquired 
distinctiveness and would not be allowed registration independently, and the scope of 
protection awarded to such elements when they are part of a complex mark, still being 
considered descriptive and non-distinctive.  
 
 
3.2.1. Marks devoid of distinctive character 
 
Marks are considered to be devoid of distinctive character if they cannot act as the 
carrier of the information concerning its origin. The reason why marks devoid of any 
distinctive character are denied registration is because then the mark cannot fulfil the 
essential function of trademark – the mark cannot indicate from which undertaking 
the product originates.99 
 
Article 7(1)(b) CTMR, stating that signs devoid of any distinctive character shall not 
be registered, can be seen as having a wider scope of application than the two 
following grounds for refusal, 7(1)(c)-(d) CTMR. A sign can qualify under these two, 
but still be considered to be devoid of any distinctive character, but if a sign fails 
under Articles 7(1)(c)-(d) then the sign is ultimately devoid of distinctive character.100 
 
The public policy justifying this ground for refusal is that a ‘mark must be capable of 
identifying the product as originating from a particular undertaking, and thus 
                                                
95 Community Trade Mark Regulation (n 9) arts 7(1)(c) and 7(1)(d) respectively. 
96 Seville (n 16) 243. 
97 Case C-353/03 Société des produits Nestlé SA v Mars UK Ltd [2005] ECR I-06135 (KitKat) para 27. 
98 Michaels and Norris (n 7) 21. 
99 SAT.2 (n 52) para 23. 
100 Case C-363/99 Koninklijke KPN Nederland NV v Benelux-Merkenbureau [2004] ECR I-01619 
(Postkantoor) paras 70 and 86. 
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distinguishing it from those of other undertakings.’101 This corresponds with the 
essential function of trademarks, i.e. as an indication of origin.102 Trademarks should 
aid consumers to repeat the experience of purchase if positive, or avoid it if it proved 
negative.103 
 
 
3.2.1.1. Relevant public 
 
Most legal examinations dealt with in this thesis should be done in relation to the 
relevant public. The relevant public is the persons making the choice that the specific 
goods or services should be bought or not. Examination is often done by referring to 
the average public or consumer if it involves consumer goods. This reflects the 
realities of the relevant market, where the attention of the relevant public depends on 
the goods or services as well as on the mark itself. The relevant public could be 
professionals or consumers, and these are more or less likely to pay attention to a 
mark.104 
 
When it comes to distinctiveness, it depends on the relevant public whether the sign is 
seen as an indication of origin or not. 
 
 
3.2.1.2. Distinctiveness 
 
A sign is devoid of distinctiveness if the average consumer cannot rely on the sign as 
an indication of commercial origin for the goods or services it is to be registered for. 
The average consumer, who is unaccustomed to the sign, should be able to, without 
any analytical or thorough examination, determine that the goods or services bearing 
the sign has a commercial origin. In other words, the sign should be seen as a 
trademark by the average consumer.105 
 
Distinctiveness should be assessed in relation to the particular goods or services 
applied for in the registration.106  It should also be assessed in relation to the 
perception of the relevant public, i.e. the average consumer of the goods or services in 
question, who are reasonably well informed and reasonably observant and 
circumspect.107 The overall impression of the sign must be considered, even though 
each component may be examined individually in the process.108 
 
The level of distinctiveness is not hard to achieve, as it would have to be ‘devoid’ of 
distinctiveness to fall under the scope of Article 7(1)(b) CTMR.109 There is no 
requirement on the sign that it should exhibit any particular level of artistic or 
linguistic creativity.110  
                                                
101 Linde (n 60) para 47. 
102 Community Trade Mark Regulation (n 9) 8th recital. 
103 Case T-79/00 Rewe Zentral AG v OHIM [2002] ECR II-00705 (Lite) para 26. 
104 Gielen and von Bomhard (n 3) 28. 
105 ibid 27-28. 
106 Postkantoor (n 100) paras 34, 72-74. 
107 ibid para 34. 
108 Case C-383/99 Procter & Gamble Co v OHIM [2001] ECR I-6251 (Baby-Dry) paras 44-45. 
109 Seville (n 16) 234. 
110 ibid 234. 
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Signs that are considered to be most distinctive are invented words or elaborate 
devices. Less distinctive are partly descriptive word marks or device marks, as well as 
the shapes of containers. Least distinctive are the shape of goods, exclusively 
descriptive words or devices and non-traditional trademarks such as smells or colours 
per se, being the least probable to communicate the origin of the goods or services 
bearing the sign.111 
 
The signs should be analysed as a whole, and the court should consider all its 
components and whether they, when used together as a sign, could function as an 
indication of origin. 112  Cases concerning distinctiveness are often about semi-
descriptive signs that have passed the other absolute grounds for refusal. The court 
would then have to look at whether the signs still should be considered as descriptive, 
or if they could convey a message of origin. 
 
This means that non-distinctive elements could be included in a complex mark as long 
as there is another element, distinctive or non-distinctive. This element together with 
the non-distinctive element that one would like to register could be considered to have 
distinctiveness when looked at as a whole, making them registrable as a sign. 
 
 
3.2.2. Marks that consist exclusively of descriptive indications 
 
Article 7(1)(c) CTMR asserts that trademarks ‘which consist exclusively of signs or 
indications which may serve, in trade, to designate the kind, quality, quantity, 
intended purpose, value, geographical origin or the time of production of the goods or 
of rendering of the service, or other characteristics of the goods or service’ shall be 
denied registration. 113  This precludes exclusively descriptive signs from being 
registered. 
 
In Windsurfing Chiemsee114  the company Windsurfing Chiemsee had registered 
CHIEMSEE as part of several composite marks, both with pictorial and word 
elements. Chiemsee is the name of the largest lake in Bavaria, and the question rose 
whether the geographical indication should be granted registration. It was argued that 
some signs, such as geographical indications, should be available to all traders that 
would want to use them.115 The Court of Justice held that the public interest behind 
Article 7(1)(c) CTMR was that some signs would have to remain available.116 
Descriptive signs should be freely available to all, and no undertaking should be able 
to prevent such descriptive signs from being used through its registration as a 
trademark.117 
 
                                                
111 Michaels and Norris (n 7) 20. 
112 SAT.2 (n 52) para 28. 
113 Community Trade Mark Regulation (n 9) art 7(1)(c). 
114 Windsurfing Chiemsee (n 12). 
115 Spyros Maniatis and Botis Dimitris, Trade Marks in Europe: A Practical Jurisprudence (2 edn, 
Sweet & Maxwell 2010) 207-08. 
116 Windsurfing Chiemsee (n 12) paras 25-26. 
117 Doublemint para 31. 
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Signs to be refused registration are only those that may serve, from the point of view 
of the relevant public, to designate, either directly or by reference to one of their 
essential characteristics, the goods or services the mark is to be registered for.118 
 
The mark would have to consist exclusively of descriptive indications to fall foul of 
Article 7(1)(c). Only if the trademark, seen as a whole, acts as a descriptive indication 
should it be refused registration.119 A mark composed of descriptive indications 
should not be refused registration unless it comprises no other signs or indications 
and, in addition, the purely descriptive signs or indications of which it is composed 
are not presented or configured in a manner that distinguishes the resultant whole 
from the usual way of designating the goods or services concerned or their essential 
characteristics.120 The addition of a distinctive element, such as a picture, could render 
the mark registrable, as it is no longer consisting exclusively of descriptive 
indications.121 The added elements would have to be at least a little distinctive, either 
by themselves or when looking at the mark as a whole. In BioID122, the addition of a 
full stop and the use of a certain font was not enough to render the mark registrable.123 
 
In Baby-Dry124, the Court of Justice considered whether the registration of the words 
BABY and DRY, configured as BABY-DRY, should be admissible in relation to 
disposable diapers. 125  The Court held that descriptiveness would have to be 
determined by looking at the components as such, but also the sign as a whole. 
Registration should not de refused when a new element, in this case the unusual 
juxtaposition, add distinctiveness to the sign.126 Both words BABY and DRY were 
considered to be descriptive, or at least indicative, of the product and its end users. In 
the end the sign could not be considered to be exclusively descriptive, prompting an 
analysis under Article 7(1)(b) CTMR. 
 
Article 7(1)(c) CTMR is mostly brought up when it comes to word marks, as these 
marks easily could describe the goods or services registered for.127 But this does not 
rule out the Article’s scope of application when it comes to non-verbal trademarks. 
Figurative marks may indeed describe the goods or services for which the mark is 
registered.128 
 
Descriptiveness should be examined in relation to the goods or services that the mark 
is to be registered for, and a relationship between the sign and the goods or services 
would have to be established.129 
 
Even though descriptive indications cannot be registered as marks individually, there 
is nothing besides Article 7(1)(b) CTMR that prevents such indications from being 
                                                
118 Baby-Dry (n 108) para 39. 
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120 Baby-Dry (n 108) para 39. 
121 Cohen Jehoram and van Nispen (n 8) 140. 
122 Case C-37/03 BioID v OHIM [2005] ECR I-07975 (BioID). 
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registered as part of a complex mark. Only if the mark also is devoid of distinctive 
character is it to be denied registration. With the result that descriptive indications 
actually can be registered, without consideration of the need to keep signs free, the 
question remains what amount of protection should be awarded to such elements of a 
complex mark. 
 
 
3.3. Marks that consist exclusively of customary indications 
 
Article 7(1)(d) CTMR states that trademarks ‘which consist exclusively of signs or 
indications which have become customary in the current language or in the bona fide 
and established practices of the trade’ shall not be registered. This provision is about 
signs that have become generic and is closely connected with Article 7(1)(c) CTMR 
about descriptiveness.130 Customary indications are often descriptive, even though 
they do not have to be, and there is often an overlap between these two Articles.131 It 
comprises common trade descriptions, as well as commonly used shapes or 
pictures.132 Such customary indications should be barred from registration, as they are 
not perceived as trademarks by the relevant public, and thus do not fulfil a 
trademark’s essential function.133 Due to this, there is also an overlap between this 
provision and Article 7(1)(b) CTMR.134 
 
This provision is very similar to Article 7(1)(c) CTMR, with the same underlying 
public interest, and will not be further addressed in this thesis, as most of what is said 
about descriptive signs also applies to customary indications. 
 
 
3.4. Disclaimers 
 
Article 37(2) CTMR holds that the Office may request that the applicant disclaims 
any exclusive rights to an element which is not distinctive, in cases where the 
inclusion of that element could give rise to doubts as to the scope of protection of the 
trademark. This is referred to as a disclaimer. They are intended to make certain that 
there is no uncertainty as to the scope of protection awarded to the trademark in case 
of a conflict with another mark.135 
 
A disclaimer results in that the disclaimed element is considered to be non-distinctive. 
No protection will be granted to the trademark containing the disclaimed element in 
case of an infringement proceeding where the only link between the two marks is the 
disclaimed element.136  
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Members of the Boards of Appeal of OHIM have voiced the opinion that disclaimers 
should be used to a larger extent, ensuring that composite marks are not given to 
broad protection regarding elements that should be able to acquire protection as 
such.137 
 
The problem is that in practice, OHIM does not seem to use its option to request 
disclaimers.138 Another is that some Member States still have trademark systems in 
which disclaimers are used more or less frequently.139 This discrepancy could pose a 
problem, as those marks that have been granted registration without the need to 
disclaim any element would potentially be granted broader protection than those 
marks that are burdened with a disclaimer. The use of disclaimers also fails to take 
into consideration distinctiveness acquired through use, and only those trademarks 
without a disclaimed element could then benefit from this. 
 
One solution would be to make disclaimers mandatory. Another would be to abandon 
the concept entirely. Following the first path would most likely create more problems, 
as the examiners would have to examine each and every element of a trademark, 
something that would possibly become tedious, especially when examining complex 
trademarks. Each element would then have to be examined from the point of view of 
distinctiveness, descriptiveness or functionality.140 Another problem is that a lot of 
trademarks already have been granted registration without the need for a disclaimer, 
resulting in that newly registered trademarks subject to a disclaimer would be at a 
disadvantage compared to the earlier marks. 
 
The alternative solution, to abandon the concept in its entirety, would be preferable. 
In the Allensbach Study141 it is proposed that it should be set out in the Preamble of 
the CTMR that a finding of a likelihood of confusion cannot be based on elements 
which are descriptive or devoid of distinctive character, rendering the use of 
disclaimers pointless.142 
 
 
3.5. Relative grounds for refusal 
 
The relative grounds for refusal, in Article 8 CTMR, relate to earlier trademarks and 
the prior rights of third parties by which they can prevent a trademark applicant from 
registering a similar or identical trademark to that of the earlier trademark. These 
rules exist to protect the owner of an earlier mark, but also to protect the function of 
origin, as the latter would be harmed if similar or identical signs existed on the 
market.143 
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The opposition should be filed within three months of the publication of the CTM 
application,144 and the relative grounds for refusal are not looked at ex officio by 
OHIM.145 Approximately 15% of all CTM applications are opposed, and about 50% 
of the oppositions are successful.146 
 
The relative grounds for refusal will be dealt with below in chapter 5 dealing with the 
scope of protection awarded to trademarks. This because the relative grounds for 
refusal can be seen as a right granted to the proprietor of an earlier trademark to 
prevent the registration of a new trademark in an opposition proceeding. 
 
 
3.6. The registration of a word 
 
This section intends to illustrate why single, descriptive or non-distinctive, elements 
cannot be registered as trademarks by themselves. As an example, single words that 
are descriptive will be used. Word marks are probably the most important category of 
marks, as these could be allusive or indicative of the goods without being obviously 
descriptive. Word marks could be names, signatures, real or invented words, 
combinations of words and slogans.147 The desire to use descriptive words as part of 
ones trademark is due to that it offers an easy and accessible source of information 
directed at the consumers.148 
 
Descriptive words include, inter alia, the name of the product as well as indications of 
quality, origin, purpose and value. For example, the word SOAP is not allowed as a 
trademark on the product soap.149 Laudatory epithets, such as BEST, are considered to 
be descriptive of the quality of the product, and are thus also considered to be a 
descriptive indication barred from registration by Article 7(1)(c) CTMR.150 
 
Such descriptive words do not fall foul of Articles 4 and 7(1)(a) CTMR. Words are 
given as an example of signs that can be registered in Article 4. The criterion that it 
should be possible to be represented graphically poses no problem as well. 
 
Hindrance for the registration of single descriptive, or non-distinctive, words are 
Article 7(1)(b) and 7(1)(c) CTMR, and such words fall foul of both. The latter of the 
two Articles prevents the registration of exclusively descriptive marks, and there is no 
question that this provision includes single words that are descriptive of the goods. 
Such words are also considered to be devoid of distinctive character, as they cannot 
indicate origin. This reasoning applies not only to words, but also to descriptive or 
non-distinctive pictures. 
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Consequently, words that are only consisting of a descriptive indication are prevented 
from being registered, with the motivation that such trademarks would grant undue 
monopolies over descriptive words that should be free for all to use. The question 
remains under what circumstances such descriptive indications can be registered as 
part of composite or compound marks.  
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4. Registration of composite and compound marks  
 
The absolute grounds for refusal, as described above, only prevent the registration of 
a descriptive indication if a mark consists exclusively of such descriptive indications. 
Similarly, the absolute grounds for refusal only prevent the registration of marks 
devoid of distinctive character. This results in that only exclusively descriptive 
trademarks, devoid of distinctive character, are barred from registration. It allows for 
such descriptive or non-distinctive indications to be registered, as part of complex 
trademarks together with other elements, as long as the trademark seen as a whole 
does not fall foul under the absolute grounds for refusal described in the previous 
chapter. 
 
Such a combination mark could either be in the form of a compound mark or a 
composite mark. Compound marks consist of a combination of words, where, for 
example, one part of the mark is distinctive and another part is descriptive or non-
distinctive. A composite mark is a combination of a word element with a picture, as in 
the case of logos. The word could be distinctive whereas the pictorial element is 
descriptive or non-distinctive, or vice versa. Many other combinations of trademarks 
are possible, such as device marks in a certain colour.151 
 
It is of interest for this thesis whether descriptive indications could form part of a 
trademark, and if the grounds for refusal described in chapter 3 apply to such marks. 
 
 
4.1. Signs of which a trademark may consist 
 
Just as the word marks described in chapter 3.6 above, Articles 4 and 7(1)(a) CTMR 
pose no problem when it comes to the registration of compound or composite marks 
encompassing a descriptive or non-distinctive element. Compound marks are 
considered to be word marks and composite marks could be seen as a design, both 
being described as possible signs in Article 4. There is nothing preventing such marks 
from being represented graphically. The hurdles to overcome for such marks are the 
other absolute grounds for refusal, and especially Article 7(1)(b) and 7(1)(c) CTMR. 
 
 
4.2. Absolute grounds for refusal 
 
4.2.1. Descriptiveness 
 
As stated above, Article 7(1)(c) CTMR prohibits the registration of trademarks 
consisting exclusively of descriptive indications. Descriptiveness should be examined 
by looking at the sign as a whole. In the case of a mark in which all elements are 
descriptive, it must be established that the trademark seen as a whole is more than the 
sum of its parts.152 If a mark, which consists of a combination of elements, is to be 
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regarded as descriptive, it is not sufficient that each of its components may be found 
to be descriptive. The word itself must be found to be so.153 
 
Composite and compound marks as those studied in this chapter could be separated 
into two categories. In the first the marks consists of several descriptive indications, 
and in the second the mark consists of a descriptive indication combined with one or 
several distinctive element. 
 
As a general rule, when several descriptive elements are made into a trademark, the 
trademark itself remains descriptive for the purpose of Article 7(1)(c) CTMR. Merely 
bringing those elements together without introducing any unusual variations, in 
particular as to syntax or meaning, cannot result in anything other than a mark 
consisting exclusively of signs or indications which may serve, in trade, to designate 
characteristics of the goods or services concerned. Such a mark would have to create 
an impression that is sufficiently far removed from that produced by the simple 
combination of those elements. There should be a perceptible difference between the 
word and the mere sum of its parts.154  
 
The addition of distinctive elements, or non-descriptive ones, will in most cases take 
the mark out of the scope of application of Article 7(1)(c) CTMR. It would have to 
result in the mark not being exclusively descriptive, resulting in the mark becoming 
subject of Article 7(1)(b) and not 7(1)(c) CTMR.155 The additional elements would 
have to be more than negligible. The absence of an accent mark was not considered to 
make a mark any less descriptive of the goods or services.156 
 
A mark moves out of the ambit of Article 7(1)(c) CTMR by the addition of another 
element, making it not exclusively consisting of descriptive indications. If one wants 
to register a descriptive indication as part of ones trademark, it can be done as long as 
another element is added. When this is done, the mark would have to be examined 
under Article 7(1)(b) CTMR to see whether the additional element renders the mark 
distinctive. 
 
 
4.2.2. Distinctiveness 
 
After a trademark containing descriptive indications pass the test under Article 7(1)(c) 
CTMR it would have to be examined under Article 7(1)(b) CTMR to see whether the 
mark, seen as a whole, is distinctive or not. A trademark should be examined as a 
whole, even though this does not prevent that all the elements are analysed separately 
with reference to distinctiveness ending in an analysis of whether the combination is 
more than the mere sum of its individual elements.157 
 
The descriptive element that is part of the mark is considered to be devoid of 
distinctive character, as descriptive elements cannot be used to indicate origin unless 
they have become distinctive through use. For such marks to be registrable, an 
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additional distinctive element would have to be added, or, if several non-distinctive 
elements are added, the mark would have to be found distinctive when considered as a 
whole. Not all ornamentations, such as colours, fonts and devices, render a mark 
registrable.158 
 
Usually marks are registered as a combination of a descriptive word and a distinctive 
design or pictorial element, or vice versa. This often renders the mark registrable due 
to the fact that there exists a distinctive element within the mark, which probably 
could have been registered by itself.159 There is also the possibility to combine several 
descriptive or non-distinctive elements, as long as the new mark is distinctive when 
seen as a whole. This was the case in Baby-Dry160 and SAT.2161 in which these marks 
where considered to only comprise non-distinctive or descriptive elements. The marks 
where deemed registrable under Article 7(1)(b) CTMR as their juxtaposition made 
them distinctive enough. 
 
 
4.3. Conclusion 
 
The absolute grounds for refusal only preclude the registration of exclusively 
descriptive signs devoid of distinctive character. It is not possible to register 
descriptive or non-distinctive signs independently unless they have acquired 
distinctiveness through use, but it is possible to register such signs either by including 
a distinctive element, or to add non-distinctive or descriptive elements in such a way 
to make the mark, when seen as a whole, distinctive.  
 
The remainder of the thesis will deal with the protection awarded to trademarks, and 
especially the amount of protection awarded to descriptive or non-distinctive 
elements, that has been shown to be registrable as part of otherwise distinctive signs. 
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5. Scope of protection 
 
The registration of descriptive indications is possible by including such indications in 
a composite or compound trademark. The question that remains is whether such a 
registration in any way grants the proprietor a right to prevent others from using or 
registering the same descriptive indication, even though there is an express need to 
keep descriptive signs free for all to use. 
 
The scope of protection is wider than the strict ambit of the registration. Trademarks 
could merit protection even when not identical to an infringing sign. Protection could 
be awarded to a trademark in case of similarity between the CTM and another sign.162 
The question is whether the protection includes instances in which the similarity 
exists only in coinciding descriptive or non-distinctive elements. 
 
It is important to remember the functions of trademarks and why trademarks in some 
cases should be granted protection.163 The functions of a trademark, and especially the 
origin function, could only be fulfilled if the proprietor of a trademark was granted, at 
least partially, exclusivity over a registered mark. The same applies to economic 
functions, such as building goodwill and repute.164  
 
To provide exclusivity over trademarks, the registration of identical signs for identical 
goods or services, as well as the registration of a confusingly similar sign for similar 
goods, should be prevented. Confusingly similar signs should only be allowed to exist 
in those cases where the goods or services registered for are dissimilar enough to 
prevent anyone from concluding that the goods or services bearing similar trademarks 
have the same commercial origin.165 There should be no restrictions on what signs 
one can use if that exercise is not liable to affect the functions of the trademark.166 
 
There are several cases in which a trademark merits protection, such as when an 
earlier mark is infringed by another confusingly similar sign, when someone takes 
unfair advantage of ones reputed trademark or detriment is done to ones trademark. 
This thesis will focus on the first of these, protection from the use of confusingly 
similar signs.167 
 
In Redrock168, the General Court granted no protection to the earlier trademark ROCK 
in an opposition proceedings against the mark REDROCK. The coinciding word 
‘rock’ could be seen as descriptive of the products for which the marks were 
registered. Due to this the signs were not considered to be similar to one another, even 
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though the goods or services were identical. Similarly, in Echinaid169, the two marks 
ECHINAID and ECHINACIN shared the prefix ‘echina’ referring to the plant 
‘echinacea’ and thus being descriptive of the goods or services applied for. The prefix 
was the only descriptive element, and these two marks have been permitted 
registration as they are compound marks and, when seen as a whole, not exclusively 
descriptive. The General Court concluded that the marks were not confusingly 
similar.  
 
In Star Snacks/Star Foods170, the marks STAR SNACKS and STAR FOODS were 
considered to be similar by the General Court, as the marks were comparable 
conceptually, even though the only coinciding element was the laudatory word ‘star’. 
The General Court came to a similar conclusion in Tofuking171 where the only 
coinciding element was the laudatory word ‘king’. In Avex172, the General Court 
considered whether two marks, both consisting of the letter ‘a’ on a black 
background, should be considered similar. Even though a single letter is potentially 
devoid of distinctive character, as the dominant element in both marks was the letter 
‘a’ they were considered to be similar. 
 
It seems as if the presence of a descriptive element sometimes precludes similarity 
between two marks, and sometimes the descriptive element, being the only element in 
which two signs coincide, is the one causing the similarity. 
 
This chapter will analyse the scope of protection awarded to trademarks as well as 
determine whether the protection extends to non-distinctive elements such as 
descriptive indications. The chapter will also try to establish why some descriptive 
indications, such as ‘king’ and ‘star’, merit protection, while other descriptive 
indications, such as ‘echina’, does not merit protection. It is important to determine 
the scope of protection awarded to such elements, as it is only then that such 
descriptive indications and their implications can be fully evaluated.  
 
Every step of the process in establishing identity and similarity will be reviewed, as 
all of these steps could, in one way or another, affect the amount of protection 
awarded to descriptive elements of trademarks.  
 
 
5.1. Opposition proceedings and infringement proceedings 
 
The proprietor of a CTM would be granted protection in two instances. Using Article 
8 CTMR, the owner of an earlier trademark could oppose the registration of a newer 
trademark that either is identical or similar to the earlier trademark. This will be 
referred to as opposition proceedings. The proprietor is also granted exclusive rights 
through Article 9 CTMR that enables him to prevent third parties from using an 
identical or similar sign, compared to the proprietors trademark, in the course of trade. 
This will be referred to as infringement proceedings.  
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Article 9 CTMR, partially reproduced below, is the provision asserting the scope of 
protection awarded to Community Trade Marks in the case of an infringement, and 
will be used to illustrate the criteria for double identity as well as for likelihood of 
confusion. There are several similarities between Article 8 and 9 CTMR. As Article 9 
CTMR mirrors the relative grounds for refusal in Article 8 CTMR, any case law 
adhering to the two Articles is relevant when determining the scope of protection 
awarded to trademarks.173 
 
Article 9 Community Trade Mark Regulation 
 
1. A Community trade mark shall confer on the proprietor exclusive rights therein. 
The proprietor shall be entitled to prevent all third parties not having his consent 
from using in the course of trade: 
 
(a) any sign which is identical with the Community trade mark in relation to goods 
or services which are identical with those for which the Community trade mark is 
registered;  
 
(b) any sign where, because of its identity with, or similarity to, the Community 
trade mark and the identity or similarity of the goods or services covered by the 
Community trade mark and the sign, there exists a likelihood of confusion on the 
part of the public; the likelihood of confusion includes the likelihood of association 
between the sign and the trade mark 
 
Thus the cases in which an earlier trademark is infringed could be separated into two 
categories: 1) that which is referred to as double identity, and 2) when there is a 
likelihood of confusion due to a similarity between the signs as well as the goods or 
services for which the signs are used. These are regulated in Article 9(1)(a) and 
9(1)(b) CTMR respectively. Once double identity or a likelihood of confusion has 
been established the outcome depends on whether it is an opposition proceeding or an 
infringement proceeding.  
 
The wordings in Article 8 and 9 CTMR are identical when it comes to double identity 
and likelihood of confusion. However, there are other similarities. Both Articles 
provide protection to the earlier mark in case it has a reputation in the Community.174 
 
Differences between the two Articles are, for example, that Article 8 CTMR gives 
further directions on what constitutes earlier trademarks, and trademarks registered in 
any Member State as well as CTMs are included.175  Whereas Article 9 gives 
examples through a non-exhaustive list of what should be considered as in the course 
of trade, as use could only be prevented in these instances.176 
 
One would also have to keep in mind Article 12 CTMR, which limits the scope of 
protection awarded to a trademark proprietor through Article 9. Article 12 provides 
some instances in which use of a sign in the course of trade should be permitted, even 
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though the sign that is being used and the earlier trademark are considered identical or 
similar with respect to Article 9(1) CTMR. 
 
This thesis focuses mainly on the concept of likelihood of confusion, under which 
descriptive indications can be seen as given too much protection. A likelihood of 
confusion exists if there is a risk that the public might believe that the goods or 
services in question come from the same undertaking or from economically-linked 
undertakings.177 In some of the cases mentioned above the proprietors of earlier 
trademarks were able to oppose the registration of what the General Court considered 
to be similar marks, even though the signs only coincided in descriptive elements. The 
remainder of this chapter will investigate under what circumstances descriptive 
elements should be given an importance in infringement and opposition proceedings, 
as well as to determine the results of such proceedings.  
 
 
5.2. Double identity 
 
Article 9(1)(a) CTMR (c.f. Article 8(1)(a) CTMR) deals with the cases in which an 
earlier trademark is infringed by an identical sign for identical goods or services for 
which the earlier mark is protected. The literal definition of identity suggests that the 
two elements compared should be the same in all aspects.178 
  
This provision expressly requires there to be identity between the sign and the earlier 
mark as well as between the goods and services in question. This provision alone 
provides for a fairly limited scope of protection, as double identity is rarely the case.  
 
Double identity is invoked in many opposition and infringement proceedings, but 
seldom leads to anything, either because it was wrongly invoked or because identity 
could not be proven in the case. Instead most refusals are due to a likelihood of 
confusion in Article 8(1)(b) and 9(1)(b) CTMR.179 
 
However, if identity actually exists, then it would be easier to prove. Compared with 
Article 9(1)(b) CTMR, no likelihood of confusion on the part of the relevant public 
would have to be proven – this follows from the absolute protection awarded in case 
of double identity.180 Another reason is that confusion is presumed in cases of double 
identity.181 
 
If identity is asserted, then absolute protection is granted by Article 9(1)(a) CTMR.182 
The reason for this absolute protection is quite obvious, as the essential function 
would be seriously harmed otherwise. The origin could not be guaranteed if others 
were allowed to use identical signs for identical goods or services.183 The same 
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applies to trademarks containing descriptive or non-distinctive elements. In cases of 
double identity the descriptive indication is not the only coinciding element, but the 
signs, seen as a whole, are identical. Even though a right is awarded to an earlier 
trademark containing descriptive elements to prevent others from using an identical 
sign, it could not be held that unreasonable protection is awarded to such trademarks 
and the descriptive indications. The trademark system and the essential function of 
trademarks would be undermined if the proprietor of a trademark, even if weakly 
distinctive, could not prevent competitors from using an identical sign. 
 
 
5.2.1. Identical sign 
 
When are two signs considered identical? Does two word marks have to be exactly 
the same to be considered identical, resulting in an interpretation of ‘identical’ to be 
objective and absolute? The concept of identity was originally construed narrowly by 
the Court of Justice. ‘The criterion of identity of the sign and the trade mark must be 
interpreted strictly. The very definition of identity implies that the two elements 
compared should be the same in all respects.’184 
 
There is ‘identity between the sign and the trade mark where the former reproduces, 
without any modification or addition, all the elements constituting the latter.’185 Thus 
all elements would have to be practically the same in all aspects.186 ‘The exercise of 
that right must therefore be reserved to cases in which a third party's use of the sign 
affects or is liable to affect the functions of the trade mark, in particular its essential 
function of guaranteeing to consumers the origin of the goods.’187 It was further 
stressed in Céline188 that the use of an identical sign should not be prevented in those 
circumstances in which it does not affect any function of the earlier mark.189 The 
absolute protection should not be awarded to trademarks in all circumstances, and 
some situations are instead covered by Article 9(1)(b) CTMR.190 
 
 
5.2.2. Border to similarity and likelihood of confusion 
 
Identity is ‘assessed globally with respect to an average consumer who is deemed to 
be reasonably well informed, reasonably observant and circumspect. The sign 
produces an overall impression on such a consumer. That consumer only rarely has 
the chance to make a direct comparison between signs and trade marks and must 
place his trust in the imperfect picture of them that he has kept in his mind.’191 One 
objection is that this would require surveys to prove who the average consumers are 
and how observant they are, and these cost a lot of money to do and are in some cases 
unreliable.192 
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This means that absolute identity is not required, and slight differences may go 
unnoticed by the average consumer and it would still be considered to be identity 
between the signs. It becomes a sliding scale in which the criteria for double identity 
are replaced with those for likelihood of confusion.193 This stance on double identity 
has been criticised as it blurs the border to cases concerning similar signs. A blur 
would be self-defeating, and such an approach should only be advised when the 
differences are minimal, such as hyphens or other similar symbols – otherwise the 
boundary to Article 9(1)(b) CTMR would be imprecise.194 
 
Double identity is not as interesting as the situations in which a trademark is granted 
protection only on the grounds that another sign is similar to the trademark. It is quite 
clear why trademarks should be granted protection in the case of double identity, as 
the function of trademarks would be seriously harmed otherwise. It is more 
interesting, from the point of view of this thesis, to analyse the concept of likelihood 
of confusion, where a trademark can be granted protection even when the element in 
which the two marks coincide is a descriptive indication. 
 
 
5.3. Likelihood of confusion 
 
When it comes to oppositions of trademark registrations based on Article 8 CTMR, 
95 % of the cases invoke similarity and a likelihood of confusion.195 These statistics 
hold true when it comes to infringements, as Article 9(1)(b) CTMR is one of the most 
frequently invoked articles in the CTMR.196 
 
The criteria in Article 9 CTMR are the same as those in Article 8 CTMR. Cases 
concerning any of the two can be used to determine the scope of protection when 
another company uses a confusingly similar sign. The concept is more abstract in 
opposition procedures, as no real confusion has yet occurred, and this could lead to a 
wider scope of protection than if the goods or services bearing that sign would have 
entered the market.197 There are identical provisions in the TMD,198 providing even 
more case law concerning the concept of likelihood of confusion. 
 
For the proprietor of a CTM to be able to prevent a third party from using a sign in the 
course of trade there would have to exist a likelihood of confusion on the part of the 
public due to a similarity between the CTM and another sign, as well as a similarity 
between the goods or services covered by the CTM and the sign.199 Only some 
guidance was given in the CTMR as to how to interpret Article 9(1)(b) CTMR: 
 
The protection should apply also in cases of similarity between the mark and the 
sign and the goods or services. An interpretation should be given of the concept of 
similarity in relation to the likelihood of confusion. The likelihood of confusion, 
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the appreciation of which depends on numerous elements and, in particular, on the 
recognition of the trade mark on the market, the association which can be made 
with the used or registered sign, the degree of similarity between the trade mark 
and the sign and between the goods or services identified, should constitute the 
specific condition for such protection.200 
 
The Court of Justice has interpreted the notion of likelihood of confusion several 
times,201 and rough guidelines on how to interpret similarity and likelihood of 
confusion have emerged. The case law has been building up since Sabel202 and is now 
applied both by national courts in relation to national trademark law based on the 
TMD, national Community trade mark courts dealing with CTMs, as well as by 
OHIM.203 
 
Absolute protection is awarded to trademarks when a confusingly similar sign is used 
for similar goods or services and there is a likelihood of confusion. The protection 
exists, foremost, to guarantee that the earlier trademark can continue to function as an 
indication of origin. 204  It follows from the origin function of trademarks that 
likelihood of confusion would have to exist in cases of similarity. There must be a 
risk that the public might believe that the goods or services in question come from the 
same undertaking or from economically linked undertakings.205 The reputation of a 
mark is protected as a result of this, as the mark is protected from losing 
distinctiveness and exclusivity.206 
 
Protection could be granted to a trademark in those situations in which the signs are 
similar and the goods or services are identical; when the signs are identical and the 
goods or services are similar, and; when the signs are similar and the goods and 
services are similar.207 The two variables (similarity of the signs and similarity of the 
goods or services) are interdependent, and a high similarity between the signs would 
require less similarity between the goods or services, and vice versa.208 
 
These are not the only criteria to be satisfied for there to be a likelihood of confusion, 
and as stated in Sabel the court would have to perform a global assessment, taking 
into consideration all relevant aspects.209 Several of these have been identified in the 
case law of the Court of Justice, and are as follow: 
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1. The likelihood of confusion must be appreciated globally, taking account of all the 
relevant factors.210  
 
2. The matter must be judged through the eyes of the average consumer of the goods 
in issue, who is deemed reasonably observant and circumspect.211 
 
3. In order to assess the degree of similarity between the marks the court must 
determine the degree of visual, aural and conceptual similarity between them and, 
where appropriate, evaluate the importance to be attached to those different elements 
taking into account the nature of the goods in question and the circumstances in which 
they are marketed.212 
 
4. The above similarities have to be assessed by reference to the overall impressions 
created by the marks bearing in mind their distinctive and dominant components. The 
perception of the marks in the mind of the average consumer plays a decisive role in 
the overall appreciation of the likelihood of confusion.213 
 
5. The average consumer perceives the mark as a whole and does not proceed to 
analyse its various details.214 The assessment of similarity does not amount to taking 
into consideration only one component of a complex trademark and comparing it with 
another mark, but each is considered as a whole.215 
 
6. There is a greater likelihood of confusion where the earlier mark is more distinctive 
(per se or due to use).216 Such marks enjoy broader protection than marks with a less 
distinctive character, so there may be a likelihood of confusion even where there is a 
lower level of similarity between the marks.217 
 
7. The average consumer has rarely any chance to make direct comparisons between 
the marks and must instead rely upon the imperfect picture of them he has kept in his 
mind, further the average consumer’s level of attention is likely to vary according to 
the category of goods in question.218 
 
8. Appreciation of the likelihood of confusion depends upon the degree of similarity 
between the goods. A lesser degree of similarity between the goods could require a 
greater similarity between the signs as such.219 
 
9. Mere association, in the sense that the later mark brings the earlier mark to mind, is 
not sufficient for the purposes of the assessment.220 
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10. The risk that the public might believe that the goods come from the same or 
economically linked undertakings does constitute a likelihood of confusion within the 
meaning of the section.221 
 
The courts would have to evaluate all these aspects when determining whether there 
exists a likelihood of confusion or not. First, the factors would have to be examined. 
Then, their relevance would have to be decided and the different factors would have 
to be weighed against one another to enable the court to come to the conclusion that 
there exists a likelihood of confusion or not.222 
 
There have been cases in which a likelihood of confusion has been established due to 
coinciding descriptive indications within the conflicting signs.223 This part of the 
thesis aims at determining under what circumstances such importance could be 
awarded to descriptive indications.  
 
Some of the factors to be taken into consideration when establishing a likelihood of 
confusion are to be dealt with more in-depth below, as these in one way or another 
could alter the way in which descriptive indications are given protection through 
Article 8(1)(b) and 9(1)(b) CTMR. 
 
 
5.3.1. The need to keep signs free and infringement procedures 
 
The Court of Justice has expressed its views on the need to keep signs free, the 
underlying public interest of Article 7(1)(c) CTMR, and its relation to infringement 
procedures and whether this need to keep free should be considered when determining 
the existence of a likelihood of confusion. The Court held that it should not be one of 
the factors to be considered. Signs that must, generally, remain available for all 
economic operators are likely to be used abusively with a view to creating confusion 
in the mind of the consumer. If, in such a context, the third party could rely on the 
requirement of availability to use a sign which is nevertheless similar to the trade 
mark freely without the proprietor of the latter being able to oppose that use by 
pleading likelihood of confusion, the effective application of Articles 8 and 9 CTMR 
would be undermined.224 
 
 
5.3.2. Relevant territory and relevant public 
 
The relevant territory could matter when comparing signs and deciding whether they 
are similar or not. The perception of similarity is likely to differ between Member 
States due to differences in language and in pronunciation (affecting aural and 
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conceptual similarities) or meaning (affecting conceptual similarities). The 
examination of CTMs must extend to the whole EU, but could be narrowed down to 
fewer countries where the likelihood of confusion is deemed to be more plausible 
(which in turn saves both time and money in the proceedings).225 
 
The relevant public is also important to consider, as some groups of consumers may 
be more attentive than others, and may be less likely to be confused.226 Some 
consumers have a high degree of attention that is directed at the signs when 
purchasing the relevant goods or services.227 If the ‘relevant public is specialised in 
the sector of the products in question [this] implies that it is likely to take great care in 
the selection of those products.’228 This could also be the case where the goods or 
services are more expensive or of a highly technological character, and the average 
consumer is more likely to think through before buying such expensive products.229 It 
could also be the opposite, in the context of fast pace consumer goods and the brief 
moments in which the average consumer decides to buy these, where the average 
consumer is less likely to pay attention to signs and trademarks.230 
 
The ‘average consumer of the category of products concerned is deemed to be 
reasonably well-informed and reasonably observant and circumspect. […] However, 
[…] the fact that the average consumer only rarely has the chance to make a direct 
comparison between the different marks but must place his trust in the imperfect 
picture of them that he has kept in his mind.’231  
 
In Redrock 232  the marks ROCK and REDROCK were registered for building 
materials, and the relevant public was held to be consumers visiting DIY stores as 
well as professionals of the construction sector. Due to the high price of the products, 
the relevant public would be showing a particularly high degree of attention at the 
time of purchase.233 This was one of the factors that led the General Court to conclude 
that there was no likelihood of confusion between the two marks, even though the 
goods and services covered by the marks were identical, and although the slightly 
descriptive word ROCK existed in both marks.234 
 
In Ayuuri Natural235 the two conflicting marks AYUR and AYUURI NATURAL 
both referred to the word ‘ayurveda’, the name of a form of alternative medicine 
originating in India.236 The General Court concurred with the claims that there exist 
consumers familiar with the word ‘ayurveda’, but held that those consumers do not 
make up a large enough part of the relevant public.237 As the greater part of the 
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relevant public would not se AYUR nor AYUURI NATURAL as referring to 
‘ayurveda’ the two marks were seen as similar enough to create a likelihood of 
confusion.238  
 
As seen in the two cases mentioned above, the relevant public could affect in which 
way descriptive indications are treated. 
 
 
5.3.3. Comparison of goods and services 
 
The comparison of goods and services is important, as at least a minimum degree of 
similarity is needed for there to be a likelihood of confusion.239 However, the 
comparison of goods and services can be made quite complicated (a possible subject 
for another Master thesis) and for the rest of this thesis it will be assumed that the 
goods or services adhering to the trademark registrations being studied are at least 
similar. Still, it could be meaningful to explain the comparison of goods and services 
to some extent. 
 
In assessing the similarity of the goods or services concerned […] all the relevant 
factors relating to those goods or services themselves should be taken into account. 
Those factors include, inter alia, their nature, their end users and their method of 
use and whether they are in competition with each other or are complementary.240 
 
To prove that there is a likelihood of confusion it is not enough to prove similarity or 
identity between the earlier mark and the sign. Article 9(1)(b) CTMR demands that 
there is at least similarity between the goods and services, even though this similarity 
could be minimal.241 
 
The similarity between the goods and services has to be done without taking into 
account the similarity of the signs or the distinctiveness of the earlier mark – there 
would have to be an objective approach, taking into consideration the realities of the 
marketplace, such as customs and trade practices in the relevant field. 242  As 
developed through Canon, there would have to be an examination of all the relevant 
aspects, and the aspects mentioned in Canon are only examples. There may be other 
factors that could affect the examination whether goods and services are similar that 
may be specific to the case at hand.243 
 
The Nice Classification system governed by WIPO could act as a starting point when 
comparing goods or services. The system encompasses several categories for which 
trademarks could be registered, and is the system used by the CTMR to classify the 
goods or services applied for.244 But the fact that the respective goods or services are 
registered in the same class in the Nice Classification system is not an absolute 
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indication that they are similar in the sense of Article 9(1)(b) CTMR. This statement 
holds true even when two registrations (specific goods/services) fall under the same 
general indication of a class heading. This holds true, although not in the same 
amount, if the specific goods or services are registered for different classes – they 
should not be deemed automatically as dissimilar. The Nice Classification system is 
best used as a rough guideline (as the Nice Classification serves administrative 
purposes originally), giving indications and hints to whether several goods or services 
are similar.245 
 
OHIM has their own database for the comparison of goods and services, which act as 
an internal search tool to speed up proceedings. The use of such a database does in 
turn result in a consistent practice, as the one handling trademark cases can see the 
reasoning in previous cases. This database is of great importance when the OHIM is 
deciding upon trademark infringement, must be consulted, and is binding over other 
sources of its practice. Even so, the database is still at an early stage.246 
 
Factors, as established in Canon, to be taken into consideration are: nature; intended 
purpose; method of use; complementarity; in competition. Additional factors are: 
distribution channels; relevant public; the usual origin of the goods or services.247 
 
The criteria listed in Canon were not given a specific order, and no hierarchy should 
be inferred from this case. They should be considered one by one, but could be given 
different weigh depending on the case at hand, as some of them are interrelated and 
some criteria are more important than others.248 Still, OHIM consider some factors as 
generally strong (such as usual origin; purpose; nature; complementarity; in 
competition) and some as less important (such as method of use; distribution 
channels; relevant public).249 
 
As the similarity between the signs is dependent on the similarity between the goods 
and services, the latter could affect the weight given to descriptive indications in 
infringement and opposition proceedings. In Tofuking250 the identity of the products 
in question was one of the factors that helped the General Court to conclude that there 
existed a likelihood of confusion between the marks CURRY KING and 
TOFUKING, even though they only coincided in the laudatory word ‘king’.251 
 
 
5.3.4. Comparison of signs 
 
Determining whether the two signs are similar is the next, very important step. All 
elements of the signs should be taken into consideration. The purpose is to decide 
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whether the two signs as such are identical, similar or dissimilar.252 This is one of the 
necessary conditions for finding that there is a likelihood of confusion.253 
 
In Sabel254 the Court of Justice held that the assessment of the similarity of the signs 
must be based on the overall impression given by the marks, bearing in mind, in 
particular, their distinctive and dominant components.255 
 
In practice, the similarity of signs is compared on three levels: visually, aurally and 
conceptually. Signs can usually be analysed on these different levels – word marks 
can be looked at visually and read out loud to be analysed aurally, as well as being 
conceptually similar to another word mark or another form of trademark. Signs are 
often analysed on all three levels, but the analysis of one level can be neglected in 
cases in which it is impossible (e.g. aural comparison of abstract figurative marks).256 
Figurative marks have mostly a visual impact on the observer, while a word mark 
may predominantly have an aural impact. There is also the case of composite marks, 
containing both a pictorial element as well as a word element. These marks will 
mostly be referred to using the word element, and thus aural similarity can be given 
greater importance in the final assessment of the similarity of the signs.257 
 
The similarity found on these three levels have to be examined and compared with 
one another. Similarity between the signs could be established if there is similarity on 
only one of the three levels, but the question is then whether this slight similarity is 
enough for there to be a likelihood of confusion.258 In most cases there would have to 
be similarity on all three levels for there to be a likelihood of confusion, and 
likelihood of confusion still depends on several factors (such as similarity between the 
goods or services) which have to be assessed separately then weighed against one 
another.259 
 
There should be a global appreciation of the visual, aural and conceptual similarities 
of the marks in question, and such an appreciation must be based on the overall 
impression given by the marks. The perception of marks in the mind of the average 
consumer of the type of goods or services in question plays a decisive role in the 
global appreciation of the likelihood of confusion, as the average consumer normally 
perceives a mark as a whole and does not proceed to analyse its various details.260 
 
Determining whether two signs are similar or not is often where descriptive 
indications can compensate for lacking distinctiveness. They are often similar (at least 
conceptually) to the same, similar or other descriptive indications. However, the 
comparison depends on the other elements of the marks as well, and the intrinsic 
qualities of these other elements often determine the protection awarded to the 
descriptive indications. 
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5.3.4.1. Signs to be compared 
 
The signs should, if possible, be compared in the form in which they are protected. 
Parts of a sign that are considered to be non-distinctive, or smaller than other 
elements, should not be ignored when comparing the signs. The fact that some 
elements are dominant or distinctive should only be taken into consideration when 
performing the overall assessment if there exists a likelihood of confusion.261 Only in 
special situations could negligible elements be omitted in the analysis of the signs.262 
The concept of negligible elements should be interpreted strictly, and it should only 
be in special cases that elements are considered too negligible and thus omitted from 
the comparison. This is for example when the element is not noticeable at first sight 
or is part of a complex sign and the relevant public is likely to disregard it.263 
 
[I]t must be held that a complex trade mark cannot be regarded as being similar to 
another trade mark which is identical or similar to one of the components of the 
complex mark, unless that component forms the dominant element within the 
overall impression created by the complex mark. That is the case where that 
component is likely to dominate, by itself, the image of that mark which the 
relevant public keeps in mind, with the result that all the other components of the 
mark are negligible within the overall impression created by it.264 
 
In IDEA265 the mark under consideration consisted of the word ‘idea’ positioned on a 
figurative element in the form of a grid. The distinctiveness of the expression ‘idea’, 
being part of the basic vocabulary of the English language, was considered to be low, 
while the distinctiveness of the figurative element was considered to be relatively 
high. Due to this the verbal element ‘idea’ was not considered to be dominant and in 
the subsequent comparison importance was given to both the verbal and figurative 
elements.266 
 
 
5.3.4.2. Visual comparison 
 
A visual comparison could be called for when comparing a sign with a device mark, 
where the earlier mark contains pictorial elements. Visual similarity could also matter 
when comparing two word marks, as the word may be pronounced differently but are 
visually similar anyhow. When comparing word marks one would have to consider 
the fashion in which the marks are shown, and whether the relevant public are likely 
to retain a mental picture of the mark as such. Word marks could also have a specific 
design or font that could lead to visual similarities. The same could be hold true for 
the use of specific colours.267 
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When it comes to consumer goods, product recognition is mostly visual, and by that 
reason the pictorial (visual) elements carry extra weight in these instances. Minor 
details and different words and headings may then be of minor importance, and the 
imperfect picture in the mind of the average consumer is the one that should be used 
in the comparison. The similarities are often more important than the differences, and 
it is the overall picture that matters and could be the one causing confusion.268 
 
In Olive Line269, the figurative marks O-LIVE and OLIVE LINE were considered 
visually similar. Both marks had figurative elements alluding to olives, the product 
for which the marks were registered. The dissimilarities could not detract from the 
similarities, as the relevant public would focus on the word ‘olive’ discernable in both 
marks. The General Court thus held the two marks to be similar visually, although 
there being differences between the two marks.270 This illustrates the fact that two 
trademarks can be considered similar, at least on a visual level, by reference only to 
the descriptive word they are consisting of. 
 
 
5.3.4.3. Aural comparison 
 
Aural similarity between two marks could in some situations be enough for the signs 
to be considered similar, and it has been shown that this correspond well with practice 
where it has been shown that aural similarities play an important role. These cases 
could for example be when the trademark is mostly heard and forwarded orally.271  
 
Figurative marks, without any word elements, does not usually provide for a good 
aural comparison. The aural comparison is mandatory when it comes to word marks 
or sound marks.272 
 
The relevant public does play an important role here as well, as they may pronounce 
words differently.273 There have been some cases giving a greater importance to the 
beginning of words, as well as to the first word where there are several, with the 
reasoning that the average consumer pay more attention to these.274 
 
In Olive Line275, the marks were not only considered to be visually similar, but also 
similar aurally. This is often the case when word marks, or composite marks where 
the word element is prominent, are compared with one another. The fact that one 
mark was OLIVE LINE and the other O-LIVE did not make the marks any less 
similar phonetically, as the new mark O-LIVE comprised the dominant parts of the 
earlier mark in its entirety.276 
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5.3.4.4. Conceptual comparison 
 
Conceptual similarities exist if the signs communicate the same or similar content. 
When it comes to word marks they can refer to exactly the same or similar thing. 
There could also be conceptual similarities between different kinds of marks, such as 
word marks and figurative marks, where the latter could depict the word used in the 
former.277 
 
[I]t should be noted that the conceptual differences which distinguish the opposing 
marks may be such as to counteract to a large extent the visual and aural 
similarities between those marks. For there to be such a counteraction, however, at 
least one of the marks at issue must have, from the point of view of the relevant 
public, a clear and specific meaning so that the public is capable of grasping it 
immediately and the other mark must have no such meaning or an entirely 
different meaning.278 
 
An example of this can be seen in Picasso/Picaro279, where the two would not likely 
be confused, as Picasso is the name of a famous painter, and Picaro is only slightly 
similar conceptually and aurally.280 
 
Signs containing descriptive elements are often similar conceptually to other signs 
containing the same or even similar descriptive elements. Companies tend to use 
similar laudatory terms, leading to conceptually similar signs. This was the case in 
Tofuking281 and Star Snacks/Star Foods282. In Tofuking the marks TOFUKING and 
CURRY KING were considered to be similar, and especially similar conceptually, as 
both marks comprised words descriptive of the goods and services registered for (also 
being similar to one another), followed by the laudatory word ‘king’.283 In Star 
Snacks/Star Foods both marks, STAR SNACKS and STAR FOODS, referred to 
goods one could eat, as well as used the laudatory word ‘star’ as a prefix to imply the 
products’ quality.284 
 
 
5.3.5. Distinctiveness 
 
Distinctiveness of the earlier mark, as well as that of the components of the signs that 
are studied, is another factor to be considered when determining whether there is a 
likelihood of confusion.285 
 
Distinctiveness has been described above, as it is a requisite to pass the absolute 
grounds for refusal.286 Distinctiveness is a mark’s possibility to act as an indication of 
origin and thus fulfilling its essential function as a trademark. In determining the 
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distinctive character of a mark the court must make an overall assessment of the 
greater or lesser capacity of the mark to identify the goods or services for which it has 
been registered as coming from a particular undertaking, and thus to distinguish those 
goods or services from those of other undertakings.287 
 
It is important to distinguish between the distinctiveness of the earlier mark as a 
whole and the distinctiveness that an element of a composite mark possesses. The 
distinctiveness of the earlier mark determines the protection afforded to that mark. 
The distinctiveness of an element of a composite mark determines its ability to 
dominate the overall impression created by the mark.288 
 
The distinctiveness of the earlier mark is to be considered in the overall assessment of 
whether there exists a likelihood of confusion or not. The distinctiveness of the earlier 
mark should not be considered when determining whether two signs are similar. A 
low degree of distinctiveness of the earlier mark should not be taken into account at 
the stage of assessing the similarity of the signs.289 If the low degree of distinctiveness 
was taken into account at this stage of the assessment, the overall distinctiveness 
would be given too much importance, and only cases of double identity would protect 
the mark from infringement.290 A low degree of distinctiveness is only one factor to 
consider when determining whether there exists a likelihood of confusion, and may be 
offset by the similarity either between the signs or between the goods or services 
covered by sign.291 
 
The more distinctive a mark is, the more protection should it be granted, and this 
should be considered in the overall assessment of a likelihood of confusion. The more 
distinctive the earlier mark, the greater will be the likelihood of confusion.  292 
 
For a mark to have more than average distinctiveness, it would be required to have 
enhanced distinctiveness due to the use made by the sign for the relevant goods or 
services.293 
 
This thesis does not consider enhanced distinctiveness. It is only interesting to study 
the consequences that the distinctiveness of a mark’s components has on the overall 
assessment of whether there is a likelihood of confusion. Descriptive indications are 
generally seen as devoid of distinctiveness. 
 
 
5.3.5.1. Distinctiveness of a mark’s components 
 
When assessing the distinctiveness of an element of a composite mark, the same 
assessment of distinctiveness is done as of the mark as a whole. It is necessary to 
assess the greater or lesser capacity of that element of the mark to identity the goods 
or services for which the mark has been registered as coming from a particular 
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undertaking.294 The distinctiveness of a component matters as it determines the 
component’s ability to dominate the overall impression created by the mark.295 
 
A component of a mark may turn out to be descriptive, laudatory or otherwise devoid 
of distinctive character. Components that have little or no distinctiveness will 
sometimes be totally disregarded when assessing similarity between the signs. In the 
case of a total absence of distinctiveness the component will likely be disregarded, 
regardless of how much the component dominates the sign visually. 
 
What constitutes the components of a mark is not clearly defined by the Court of 
Justice. The perception of the relevant public is the one that matters, and if they are 
considered to distinguish a component from the rest of the sign, then this should be 
considered as being a separate component.296 All aspects of the mark should be 
analysed, including, inter alia, words, figurative elements and colours.297 
 
In Echinaid298, the two marks ECHINAID and ECHINACIN shared the prefix 
‘echina-’, referring to the plant ‘echinacea’ and thus describing the product for which 
the marks were registered. The shared prefix, due to its descriptive nature, was seen as 
devoid of distinctive character and was given no attention when determining the 
existence of a likelihood of confusion. Instead, only the endings, ‘-id’ and ‘-cin’ were 
compared, resulting in that no likelihood of confusion was found by the General 
Court.299 
 
The court came to the opposite conclusion in Olive Line300, in which the two marks 
were considered to be similar, even though the coinciding word ‘olive’ was 
descriptive of the goods and services for which the marks were registered. The 
descriptiveness was not enough to render the word devoid of distinctiveness. The 
General Court held that the reason for why they treated this case differently from 
Echinaid was that the word ‘olive’ in Olive Line was highlighted in both marks by the 
use of pictorial elements suggestive as to olives.301 
 
The main rule seems to be that descriptive elements should be disregarded when 
comparing signs. This rule can be put aside under certain circumstances, as for 
example when the descriptive element is accentuated by the rest of the elements of the 
mark. 
 
 
5.3.5.2. Disclaimers 
 
The concept of disclaimers has been dealt with above. The existence of disclaimers 
matters when determining whether two marks are similar. If a component of a sign is 
disclaimed, then that element is considered void of distinctiveness. There will be no 
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protection awarded to a sign in the specific case if the two signs only coincide with 
the disclaimed element.302 
 
 
5.3.6. Dominant character 
 
A complex trademark cannot be regarded as being similar to another trademark that is 
identical or similar to one of the components of the complex mark, unless that 
component forms the dominant element within the overall impression created by the 
complex mark. That is the case where that component is likely to dominate, by itself, 
the image of that mark which the relevant public keeps in mind, with the result that all 
the other components of the mark are negligible within the overall impression created 
by it.303 
 
When determining whether a likelihood of confusion exists, the similarity between 
the two signs should be assessed by looking at the signs as a whole, but consideration 
could be taken to their distinctive and dominant components.304 Only in some cases 
can two marks be regarded as similar when they only correspond in some of their 
elements, and only then if these elements can be considered as having a dominant 
character. Such an element must be likely to dominate, by itself, the image of that 
mark with the result that all other components of the mark are negligible within the 
overall impression created by the mark. It is only if all components of the mark are 
negligible that the dominant component alone can be assessed as to similarity.305 
 
Consideration should be taken of the imperfect picture of the average consumer, as 
they often only remember the dominant and distinctive characteristics of a sign, 
justifying the fact that such characteristics are given more weight in some cases.306 
 
What should be considered as a component is as stated above, any elements that 
would be singled out by the average consumer as a possible separate component.307 
 
In Limoncello Shaker308, the General Court had to assess whether the two marks 
LIMONCHELO and LIMONCELLO, the latter being a figurative mark, were similar 
enough to cause a likelihood of confusion. The word ‘Limoncello’ was considered to 
be dominant in the opposed mark, even though it was argued that the word 
‘Limoncello’ was descriptive, and even though there was a pictorial element taking up 
equally much space. The General Court held that the relevant public was, through 
their imperfect recollection of the mark, likely to confuse the two marks.309 It is not 
clear cut what should be considered as the dominant element of a mark, but the 
finding that a descriptive indication is the dominant element could award the 
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descriptive indication more protection than if it should not have been considered as 
dominant within the mark. 
 
 
5.3.6.1. Assessing dominance 
 
When assessing dominant character of a component of a compound mark, account 
must be taken of the intrinsic qualities of the component compared with the others of 
that compound mark. Account should also be taken of the relative position of the 
various components within the arrangement of the compound mark.310 
 
 
5.3.6.2. Dominant character and distinctiveness 
 
As a general rule, the public will not consider a descriptive element forming part of a 
complex mark as the distinctive and dominant element of the overall impression 
conveyed by that mark, but there is nothing that stops such a non-distinctive element 
from being regarded as a dominant element. The weak distinctive character of an 
element of a complex mark does not necessarily imply that that element cannot 
constitute a dominant element since, because, in particular, of its position in the sign 
or its size, it may make an impression on consumers and be remembered by them.311 
 
In Echinaid312, the trademark registration of the word ECHINAID was opposed by the 
owner of the international word mark ECHINACIN. The shared prefix, ‘echina-’, 
refers to the plant ‘echinacea’, thus being descriptive for the goods or services applied 
for. Due to it being descriptive, the average consumer was deemed likely to pay 
attention to the endings of the mark rather than the prefix. The General Court, due to 
this line of reasoning, concluded that there was no likelihood of confusion in this 
case.313 
 
In Golden Eagle314, the earlier mark, registered for different kinds of coffee, consisted 
of a device depicting a red coffee mug on a bed of coffee beans. The proprietor of the 
earlier mark opposed the registration of a figurative mark with the words GOLDEN 
EAGLE also depicting a red coffee mug on a bed of coffee beans. The General Court 
assessed there to be a slight similarity between the marks, thus creating a likelihood of 
confusion between the marks. The red coffee mug was not devoid of distinctiveness, 
it was only considered to be not highly distinctive and suggestive of the goods.315 
 
In Star Snacks/Star Foods316, the words SNACKS and FOODS were considered to be 
descriptive of the goods and services the marks were registered for, and the word 
STAR was deemed laudatory, referring to products of high quality. Even though the 
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elements where descriptive and laudatory, the marks where considered to be similar 
by the General Court, leading to a likelihood of confusion.317 
 
In Tofuking318, the General Court held two marks, TOFUKING and CURRY KING, 
to be similar, resulting in a likelihood of confusion, due to them both containing the 
same descriptive word KING. The Board of Appeal had earlier rejected the opposition 
with the same reasoning: that the only coinciding element between the two marks was 
the descriptive word KING, and thus no likelihood of confusion could exist between 
the marks. 
 
Concerns have risen that this trend will continue, allowing proprietors to successfully 
oppose registrations on grounds of their descriptive elements. This would effectively 
grant monopolies over certain descriptive or laudatory indications, and chances to 
register new trademarks would grow slimmer.319 
 
 
5.3.7. Assessment of factors – a global assessment 
 
The courts would have to evaluate all aspects when determining whether there exists a 
likelihood of confusion or not. First, the factors would have to be examined. Then, 
their relevance would have to be decided and the different factors would have to be 
weighed against one another to enable the court to come to the conclusion that there 
exists a likelihood of confusion or not.320 As seen above, several of the factors to be 
considered can have an effect on how descriptive indications are treated when 
establishing a likelihood of confusion. 
 
 
5.4. The scope of protection 
 
It has been established that in certain instances there could be a likelihood of 
confusion where the signs only coincide in a descriptive element,321 and it is now 
important to determine what such a finding will result in. Once a likelihood of 
confusion has been established the outcome depends on whether it is an opposition 
proceeding or infringement proceeding. 
 
 
5.4.1. Opposition proceedings 
 
A successful opposition would prevent the registration of the new trademark.322 
Trademarks are granted protection not only against the use of identical signs, but also 
the use by third parties of similar signs under the circumstances described above. This 
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could result in unmeritorious opposition proceedings where the proprietor of a 
trademark encompassing a descriptive indication could scare third parties not able to 
defend themselves because of financial means from registering a similar mark.323 
 
 
5.4.2. Infringement proceedings 
 
Infringement proceedings prevent the use of a sign in the course of trade.324  
Infringement proceedings are used when an identical or similar sign is used without it 
being applied for registration.  
 
The scope of application of Article 9 CTMR is thus wider than that of Article 8, as it 
acts to prevent the mere use of a similar sign. Limitations have been added to prevent 
an extensive use of infringement proceeding. Article 9 CTMR only prevents use in 
the course of trade, and Article 12 CTMR provides for several defences, such as the 
ability to use descriptive indications honestly in the course of trade. 
 
 
5.4.2.1. Use in the course of trade 
 
A non-exhaustive list as to activities that are to be considered as use in the course of 
trade is presented in Article 9(2) CTMR: 
 
The following, inter alia, may be prohibited under paragraph 1: 
 
(a) affixing the sign to the goods or to the packaging thereof;  
 
(b) offering the goods, putting them on the market or stocking them for these 
purposes under that sign, or offering or supplying services thereunder;  
 
(c) importing or exporting the goods under that sign;  
 
(d) using the sign on business papers and in advertising.  
 
Use in the course of trade should be understood as use ‘in the context of commercial 
activity with a view to economic advantage and not as a private matter’.325 If the use 
does not affect the essential function of trademarks, i.e. its function as an indication of 
origin, then it cannot be prevented.326 
 
 
5.4.2.2. Defences 
 
There are limitations to the rights conferred by Article 9 CTMR listed in Article 12 
CTMR, provided below. 
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A Community trade mark shall not entitle the proprietor to prohibit a third party 
from using in the course of trade: 
  
(a) his own name or address;  
 
(b) indications concerning the kind, quality, quantity, intended purpose, value, 
geographical origin, the time of production of the goods or of rendering of the 
service, or other characteristics of the goods or service;  
 
(c) the trade mark where it is necessary to indicate the intended purpose of a 
product or service, in particular as accessories or spare parts,  
 
provided he uses them in accordance with honest practices in industrial or 
commercial matters. 
 
Due to this provision, descriptive indications are allowed to be used honestly in the 
course of trade by anyone who desires to do so. It could be argued that this would 
solve many of the problems where descriptive indications are monopolised through 
trademarks, and that the risk that operators might appropriate certain signs which 
ought to remain available is neutralised by the limits imposed by Article 12.327 One 
problem, observed by the Allensbach Study, is that non-distinctive indications are not 
included in Article 12.328 
 
Article 12 seeks to reconcile the fundamental interests of trademark protection with 
those of free movement of goods in the common market in such a way that trademark 
rights are able to fulfil their essential role in the system of undistorted competition.329 
On the one hand the trademark system seeks to protect the essential function of 
trademarks, and on the other hand to promote need to keep certain signs free for all to 
use.330 
 
It was initially thought that Article 12 CTMR did not confer the right to use 
descriptive indications as trademark, but merely to use them descriptively in 
accordance with honest practices in industrial and commercial matters. 331  This 
changed with Kerry Spring332 in which the Court of Justice held the actual use of the 
descriptive indication did not matter.333 In this case the proprietor of the earlier 
GERRI mark opposed the registration of the KERRY SPRING mark, where the latter 
was descriptive as of origin. 
 
Instead, it is important to determine what constitutes ‘honest practices in industrial 
and commercial matters’. It is not in line with honest practices if the use of the sign 
creates the impression that a link exists between the parties.334 This can be compared 
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with the definition of a likelihood of confusion, which is the risk that the public might 
believe that the goods or services in question come from the same undertaking or, as 
the case may be, from economically-linked undertakings.335 The Court of Justice has 
held that the existence of a likelihood of confusion does not necessarily mean that the 
use is in breach of honest practices,336 but it is not difficult to understand that it can be 
difficult in practice to draw a line between the two. Instead, it is necessary to see 
whether the use of the sign is against honest practices, and the amount of allowed use 
becomes a question of degree. The courts must carry out an overall assessment of all 
the relevant circumstances to determine whether the defendant has engaged in unfair 
competition or acts in accordance with honest practices.337 
 
It is also feared that this approach is liable to shift the balance of power in favour of a 
trademark owner with monopolistic ambitions who may assert, or threaten to assert, 
his rights against an alleged ‘infringer’ who merely seeks to use descriptive terms 
descriptively and honestly.338 A fully functioning fair use defence could enhance the 
trademark system, by which it becomes impossible to monopolise descriptive 
indications that others have an interest in using. However, if the fair use defence is 
defined too narrowly it could have implications on consumers and competitors, as it 
does not award an appropriate level of protection to the free use of descriptive 
indications.339 
 
A trademark owner wishing to monopolise not only his trademark, but the area 
around it, may threaten unmeritorious proceedings against a competitor, who may 
capitulate rather than incur the costs of litigation as well as risk an adverse 
outcome.340  
 
It must be a stringent and full examination, in order to prevent trademarks from being 
improperly registered. For reasons of legal certainty and good administration, it is 
necessary to ensure that trade marks whose use could successfully be challenged 
before the courts are not registered to begin with.341 
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6. Proposal for amending the Community Trade 
Mark Regulation 
 
On the 27th of March 2013 came a proposal from the European Commission on 
amending the Community Trade Mark Regulation.342 It was partly based on the 
Allensbach Study already mentioned in the thesis, in which it was concluded that the 
Community Trade Mark system, seen as a whole, is solid. Nevertheless, some further 
convergence of trademark laws and practices in the EU was required.343 
 
Changes are proposed, of which some would affect the way in which descriptive 
indications are treated, thus justifying this chapter in the thesis in which these changes 
will be examined. These changes include a clarification of the origin function’s role 
when determining double identity or the existence of a likelihood of confusion, as 
well as clarifications regarding Article 12 CTMR. 
 
In the proposal it is clarified that in cases of both double identity under Article 9(1)(a) 
and similarity under Article 9(1)(b) it is only the origin function that matters.344 That 
is, protection should be granted to a mark when the essential function of trademarks, 
i.e. its function as an indication of origin, is adversely affected.345 
 
The reason for including such a clarification is probably to clarify that the essential 
function also applies to cases of double identity. The courts ruling on trademark 
infringements and oppositions should not assume that the origin function is adversely 
affected just because double identity is established. 
 
When it comes to Article 12 CTMR, the Commission’s proposal suggests that the 
Article should include non-distinctive indications alongside the descriptive 
indications already covered by the Article.346 They also propose that a clarification of 
what constitutes honest practices is added in a new Article 12(2) CTMR, stating that 
the use by a third party shall be considered not to be in accordance with honest 
practices if it gives the impression that there is a commercial connection between the 
third party and the proprietor of the trade mark.347 
 
This would lead to a codification of case law from the Court of Justice, but would not 
bring us any closer to understand the relationship between the existence of a 
likelihood of confusion and the existence of an impression that there is a commercial 
connection between two separate businesses. 
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7. Analysis 
 
[I]n the practical world powerful traders will naturally assert their rights even in 
marginal cases. By granting registration of a semi-descriptive or indeed a nearly-
but-not-quite-completely descriptive mark one is placing a powerful weapon in 
powerful hands. […] With such words or phrases the line between trade mark and 
descriptive use is not always sharp. Moreover, it must not be forgotten that the 
monopoly extends to confusingly similar marks. In any marginal case defendants, 
[small and medium-sized enterprises] particularly, are likely to back off when they 
receive a letter before action. It is cheaper and more certain to do that than stand 
and fight, even if in principle they have a defence.348 
 
This thesis has posed the questions whether descriptive or non-distinctive indications 
can be registered as part of trademarks, and, if so, could the proprietor of such a 
trademark prevent others from using the indication. To sum up: yes, it is possible to 
register a descriptive indication as part of a trademark, and yes, it is possible to use 
such a trademark to exclude others from registering that same descriptive indication. 
 
The possibility to register descriptive or non-distinctive indications is determined by 
Article 7 CTMR, and a mark would have to pass the absolute grounds for refusal to be 
registrable. The most important grounds for refusal when it comes to descriptive or 
non-distinctive signs are Articles 7(1)(b) - (c) CTMR in which the registration of 
signs devoid of distinctive character and signs consisting exclusively of descriptive 
indications are prevented. There are two underlying public interests of these 
provisions. Non-distinctive marks are precluded from registration, as the essential 
function of trademarks would otherwise be harmed; the registration of a sign that is 
not seen as a trademark by the relevant public could not act as an indication of origin. 
Descriptive indications, on the other hand, are precluded from registration due to a 
need to keep certain signs free for all to use. It is feared that the registration of such 
descriptive indications would result in the monopolisation of the public domain. 
 
However, the absolute grounds for refusal only prohibit the registration of descriptive 
and non-distinctive signs as long as they are exclusively descriptive and devoid of 
distinctive character. Descriptive words are prevented from being registered when 
isolated, but the addition of other elements could make the word registrable as part of 
a composite or compound mark. As long as elements are added so that the sign, when 
seen as a whole, is not considered as exclusively descriptive or devoid of 
distinctiveness, then the sign can be registered. The need to keep free can thus be 
trumped by acquired distinctiveness by adding additional distinctive or non-
distinctive elements. Thus, to register a descriptive word, one would only have to add 
other elements. These elements could in turn be descriptive, distinctive or non-
distinctive, as long as the mark seen as a whole is distinctive and non-descriptive. 
 
Descriptive indications can thus be registered as an element of a mark. The question 
that follows is whether such descriptive indications are awarded any protection? 
 
The scope of protection awarded to trademarks can be divided into the right to oppose 
registrations through opposition proceedings and the right to oppose use of a similar 
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sign through infringement proceedings. These proceedings can be initiated in cases of 
double identity or when there is a likelihood of confusion. It is the latter that has been 
interesting to study, from the point of view of this thesis, as it allows the proprietor of 
a mark to prohibit others from using similar signs. 
 
When determining the existence of a likelihood of confusion, several factors should 
be considered, all of which could affect how descriptive indications are treated. There 
have been several rulings from the General Court in which descriptive elements have 
been given different degrees of protection. In Echinaid, the common descriptive 
element ‘echina’ was left out of the analysis made by the court, and no likelihood of 
confusion was found, as this descriptive element was the only visual similarity 
between the marks. In Golden Eagle, the registration of a picture of a cup of coffee 
was awarded protection, and the registration of a mark containing a similar picture 
was successfully opposed. In Star Snacks/Star Foods the coinciding element ‘star’ 
was seen as laudatory and describing the quality of the product, but was still given 
importance and a likelihood of confusion between the two marks was found. The 
same happened in Tofuking in which the proprietor of the word mark CURRY KING 
successfully opposed the registration of the word mark TOFUKING due to the 
similarity of the two signs as they both used the word ‘king’. The word ‘king’ was, 
similar to the assessment in Star Snack/Star Foods, considered to be laudatory as it 
describes the good quality of the products. In some of these cases the Board of Appeal 
had come to a different conclusion. 
 
The results of the proceedings depends on whether it was an opposition or 
infringement proceeding. The former results in a trademark being prevented from 
registration. In the latter the trademark proprietor could prevent the use of a sign, but 
in these cases the defendant could invoke several defences. The defendant is allowed 
to use descriptive indications as long as the use is in accordance with honest practices. 
The new Commission Proposal has dealt with what should be considered as honest 
practices, and stated that use of a sign shall not be considered to be in accordance with 
honest practices if it gives the impression that there is a commercial connection 
between the defendant and the proprietor.  
 
Not all infringements in which there is a likelihood of confusion are also in breach of 
honest practices. However, the similar concepts would likely result in that many 
cases, in which confusion is established, the descriptive use defence cannot be 
utilized.  
 
It is thus possible to register descriptive indications and later prevent others from 
using the same descriptive indications, either through infringement or opposition 
proceedings. 
 
There exists an incentive for businesses to choose descriptive marks for their goods. If 
they are successful in registering such descriptive marks, and if they are successful in 
prohibiting others from using the descriptive indications, it places the registrant's 
competitors at a disadvantage in marketing their similar goods as they cannot forward 
descriptive information as easily. Furthermore, consumers experience greater 
difficulty in obtaining the information necessary to make optimal purchasing 
decisions. 
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A trademark proprietor may also threaten unmeritorious proceedings against 
competitors wishing to use descriptive indications that are part of the proprietor’s 
trademark. The competitors may yield rather than paying the costs related to such an 
infringement proceeding as well as risk an adverse outcome. 
 
One could argue that any negative effects are lessened by Article 12 CTMR, as this 
provision permits the use of descriptive marks in the course of trade. This is only true 
to a certain extent, as the applicability of Article 12 in cases concerning a likelihood 
of confusion is still somewhat unclear. This would also transfer the review from 
OHIM during registration to the courts judging infringements. 
 
It is thus better to bar descriptive trademarks from registration at an early stage. This 
would reduce the risk that such trademarks are used against defendants that do not 
have the will and necessary means to defend such an unmeritorious trademark 
infringement action. Such extortion would also have the effect of broadening the 
scope of trademark protection. In a dispute where Article 12 CTMR is relied on, the 
proprietor of the earlier trademark will always enjoy an advantage. 
 
Another negative effect with allowing a too broad protection to descriptive indications 
is that it would effectively reduce chances to register new trademarks. The possibility 
for traders to monopolise terms that may serve to designate a product’s characteristics 
would grant him an unfair advantage over competitors who have an interest in using 
such descriptive terms. Competitors could be disadvantaged, and in some cases even 
prevented, from entering the market at all.  
 
Establishing a likelihood of confusion can be seen as somewhat arbitrary; sometimes 
granting protection to descriptive indications, sometimes disregarding them entirely. 
The scope of protection awarded to trademarks and descriptive indications is still 
unclear, making it difficult to predict the outcome in litigation. This uncertainty 
negatively affects those businesses already having a trademark, as well as those 
desirous of registering one.  
 
The likelihood of confusion test can be seen as complicated and is possibly in a need 
for restructuring and revising to better fit the underlying interests of trademark law 
and trademark protection. The legislator would have to balance several public 
interests, such as the need to ensure the origin function and distinctiveness of 
trademarks, safeguarding the investments made by proprietors into their trademarks, 
as well as preventing non-distinctive signs from being registered and used to distort 
competition.  
 
Today the courts seem to focus on the protection of consumers from confusion as of 
origin, by prohibiting the use of similar signs, even in instances in which similar signs 
only coincide in descriptive indications. Other interests, such as keeping descriptive 
signs free, are disregarded. It can be questioned whether such actions are justified by 
public interests. Clearly descriptive indications such as the name of the product will 
not be regarded as an element possible of causing a likelihood of confusion. However, 
the monopolisation of descriptive indications such as laudatory terms is to some 
extent possible. A company desirous of monopolising a descriptive indication could, 
for example, add elements that enhance the descriptive indication, as was the case in 
Olive Line. 
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So, what could be done? One proposed solution is a more extensive use of 
disclaimers, in which it would be stated that no protection is granted to a disclaimed 
element in case of infringement or opposition proceedings.  
 
As stated earlier in the thesis, the problem with disclaimers is that OHIM has 
requested very few of them in its practice. Furthermore, not all Member States use 
them in their national trademark systems, creating a discrepancy between those marks 
burdened with a disclaimer and those that are not. The use of disclaimers also fails to 
take into consideration distinctiveness acquired through use, and only those 
trademarks without a disclaimed element could then benefit from this.  
 
Another solution was put forward in the Allensbach Study in which it was proposed 
that it should be set out in the Preamble of the CTMR that a finding of a likelihood of 
confusion cannot be based on elements which are descriptive or devoid of distinctive 
character, rendering the use of disclaimers pointless. This is a more preferable 
solution as case law would become coherent in the matter, as well as the fact that an 
undertaking could not monopolise descriptive indications. 
 
A third solution would be to wait for clearer guidance from the Court of Justice on 
how to treat distinctive indications that are part of trademarks. This would also solve 
the problem with incoherent case law from the lower courts. Today, it seems as the 
lower courts are not completely sure as to what extent they should grant protection to 
descriptive indications, nor how the indications should be treated when analysing the 
similarities of marks. This is also the case when establishing a likelihood of 
confusion. Consequently, descriptive indications are sometimes given too broad 
protection; protection that should be more or less limited to facilitate other interests. 
 
Limiting the protection of partly descriptive marks would possibly have another 
consequence, namely the emergence of more creative and imaginative marks by 
which undertakings can indicate business origin. The protection of non-distinctive 
descriptive elements is unnecessary, and it is proven that descriptive marks are not 
needed for success on today’s market. Some of the most successful trademarks of our 
time are inventive and original, and not at all descriptive. Everyone should be allowed 
to use descriptive indications, but for their actual and inherent purpose – to describe.  
 
Extensive trademark monopolies should only be granted protection if they can be 
justified on the basis of public policy. It should not be possible to monopolise 
descriptive indications, nor should businesses be able to use them unreasonably to 
confuse consumers as to business origin. Currently, the protection of consumers from 
confusion is given precedence. This protection, as it is executed now, does not 
provide such a public policy justification. Trademarks should get the protection they 
deserve, not more, nor less.  
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